Public Employee Speech and the Privatization of the First Amendment by Shinar, Adam
University of Connecticut 
OpenCommons@UConn 
Connecticut Law Review School of Law 
2013 
Public Employee Speech and the Privatization of the First 
Amendment 
Adam Shinar 
Follow this and additional works at: https://opencommons.uconn.edu/law_review 
Recommended Citation 
Shinar, Adam, "Public Employee Speech and the Privatization of the First Amendment" (2013). 
Connecticut Law Review. 215. 
https://opencommons.uconn.edu/law_review/215 
 1 
CONNECTICUT 
LAW REVIEW 
 
VOLUME 46 NOVEMBER 2013 NUMBER 1 
 
Article 
Public Employee Free Speech and the 
Privatization of the First Amendment 
ADAM SHINAR 
Constitutional protection of public employee speech has been declining 
for the past forty years, yet the reason for the decline has remained elusive.  
This Article puts forward a novel theory situating public employee speech 
in larger structural transformations in governmental organization.  It 
identifies a “public/private convergence,” the main feature of which is that 
public officials are increasingly viewed as private employees, resulting in a 
significant erosion of their free speech rights.  This erosion is exacerbated 
by rising levels of privatization and civil service reforms exhibiting the 
same mode of thought: that public employees are no different from private 
employees.  These trends have far reaching First Amendment implications 
that up until now have remained largely unexplored. 
Against this background, this Article argues that the privatization of 
public employee speech doctrine should be reconsidered for three main 
reasons.  First, it overlooks the ways in which the public sector does not 
operate like the market.  Second, it risks eroding the unique norms and 
culture the civil service aims to foster.  Finally, it undermines a system of 
internal checks on state power that are especially important given the 
reduction in external monitoring capacity.  Accordingly, the Article 
proposes two directions for reform: a doctrinal framework that resolves 
the problems with the Court’s current position, and a new governance 
framework that relies on internal regulatory channels to encourage public 
employee voice. 
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Public Employee Speech and the  
Privatization of the First Amendment 
ADAM SHINAR∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The twentieth century saw an unprecedented rise in the constitutional 
protection of speech—a trajectory that has continued into the twenty-first 
century.  The Supreme Court’s recent decisions to strike down limits on 
corporate expenditures on political campaigns,1 to revoke damages for 
emotional distress caused by speech,2 to invalidate legislation regulating 
violent video games3 and depictions of animal cruelty,4 to expand the scope 
of commercial speech,5 and, most recently, to protect knowingly false 
statements,6 have positioned freedom of expression as the most protected, 
and perhaps most important, constitutional right. 
Curiously, during the past forty years, as the Court expanded free 
speech protections for individuals it also consistently cut back on free 
speech protections for public sector employees.  These employees have 
seen their speech rights dwindle close to their nineteenth-century level, 
when no constitutional protection was afforded. 
Consider, for example, the recent case of Bryan Gonzalez.  Gonzalez 
                                                                                                                          
∗ Assistant Professor, Radzyner School of Law, Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya. S.J.D. & 
LL.M., Harvard Law School; LL.B., Hebrew University of Jerusalem.  I am grateful to Ori Aronson, 
David Barron, Faisal Bhabha, Caroline Corbin, Sam Erman, Claire Houston, Lisa Kelly, Heidi 
Kitrosser, Shay Lavie, Orly Lobel, Martha Minow, Helen Norton, David Pozen, Issi Rosen-Zvi, Ben 
Sachs, Paul Secunda, Roy Shapira, Jennifer Shkabatur, Anna Su, Mark Tushnet, Katie Young, and to 
participants at the Faculty Research Seminar at Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, the 
Loyola-Chicago Constitutional Law Colloquium, the Harvard Law School S.J.D. Colloquium, the Yale 
Law School Freedom of Expression Scholars conference, and participants at faculty workshops at Bar 
Ilan University, Hebrew University, Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya, Haifa University, and Tel Aviv 
University. 
1 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 339, 341 (2010) (holding that the First 
Amendment prohibits limits on independent political expenditures by corporations and unions). 
2 Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1219 (2011) (holding that speech on a public issue on a 
public sidewalk cannot give rise to tort liability of emotional distress). 
3 Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2741–42 (2011) (holding that video games are 
protected speech under the First Amendment). 
4 United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 481–82 (2010) (invalidating a law that criminalized 
depictions of animal cruelty because it was overly broad under First Amendment doctrine). 
5 Sorrell v. IMS Health, 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2659 (2011) (invalidating a law that restricted the sale of 
data revealing doctors’ prescription practices). 
6 United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2543 (2012) (invalidating part of the Stolen Valor Act 
of 2005, which criminalized false claims of having received a military medal). 
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was a United States Border Patrol agent along the U.S.-Mexico border.7  
While at work, Gonzalez spoke to a fellow agent about the drug-related 
violence in Mexico and its effects on their job.8  Gonzalez said that if 
marijuana was legalized, the cartel violence would stop.9  The drug 
problems in America, he added, were attributable to an American demand 
for drugs.10  Gonzalez also mentioned an organization—Law Enforcement 
Against Prohibition—made up of former law enforcement officials who are 
critical of the “war on drugs.”11  When Gonzalez’s superiors soon learned 
of this conversation, they fired him.12  The termination letter stated his 
personal views were “contrary to the core characteristics of Border Patrol 
Agents, which are patriotism, dedication, and esprit de corps.”13 
Gonzalez’s case is interesting not only because he was fired, but 
because in all likelihood he could not have been fired for the same 
expression in 1968—when constitutional speech protections for public 
employees were at their height.  This Article, therefore, starts with a basic 
question: Why has the Court, an otherwise aggressive defender of free 
speech rights, driven protections for public employees to the lowest ebb in 
more than a century?  The decline in constitutional protection, I argue, 
cannot be understood by focusing exclusively on First Amendment 
doctrine.  That doctrine tells us that public employees today enjoy less 
protection than their counterparts forty years ago, but fails to explain how 
particular social, economic, and philosophical commitments have shaped 
present free speech conceptions. 
While the decline in constitutional protection for public employees has 
been noted by scholars, few have offered a convincing and comprehensive 
explanation for its occurrence.14  This Article seeks to fill that gap by 
putting forward a novel explanation—the “public/private convergence 
thesis.”  I argue that it is no coincidence that the constitutional speech 
rights public employees have today are close to their nineteenth-century 
level, because back then public employees were not considered to be any 
different from private sector employees.  Indeed, the Article argues that the 
decreasing speech protections for public employees result from a 
background understanding that views public employees as no different 
                                                                                                                          
7 Gonzalez v. Manjarrez, No. EP-11-CV-29-KC, 2013 WL 152177, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 4, 
2013). 
8 Complaint at 3, Gonzalez, 2013 WL 152177 (No. EP-11-CV-29-KC). 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. at 4. 
12 Id. at 2, 4. 
13 Id. at 4. 
14 But see Paul M. Secunda, Neoformalism and the Reemergence of the Rights-Privilege 
Distinction in Public Employment Law, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 907, 908 (2011) (asserting that “[t]he 
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions in public employment has figured most notably in First 
Amendment free speech”).  For further discussion, see infra note 90. 
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from private employees and hence seeks to equalize their constitutional 
status.  This equalization is done by leveling down the constitutional rights 
enjoyed by public employees to those of private sector employees who do 
not enjoy First Amendment protection at work because of the lack of state 
action.  Although the convergence may not be intentional, it is nevertheless 
informed by a background understanding, one which maps onto larger 
transformations in government organization exhibiting the same mode of 
thought, that public employees are no different than private employees. 
The public/private convergence is troubling because there are 
differences between the government and the private sector, and between 
private and public employees.  These differences should be maintained 
rather than obscured.  Accordingly, the Article identifies four difficulties 
that stem from the project of convergence.  First, the importation of market 
logics into the government workplace as a primary metric confuses firms, 
which operate in a competitive for-profit environment, with government, 
which does not.  Second, convergence misunderstands the task of 
government.  Employment at will is the basic norm in private employment 
because it views the employer as “owning the job with the property right to 
control the job and the worker who fills it.”15  But the government’s 
property is, in an important sense, our own.  Thus, government is a trustee 
of the public interest in a way that private firms are not.  Third, the 
marketization of the public workplace means losing sight of the importance 
of public service and its unique norms and culture.  When public workers 
are conditioned to operate like market participants, the likelihood that they 
will espouse a public service ethic decreases, as does the likelihood that 
they will exercise speech in a beneficial way.  Finally and most crucially, 
public employees are often in the best position to inform the government 
and the public about wrongdoing, abuse, mismanagement, and other 
problems that they encounter.  Public employee speech thus serves to 
maintain a system of internal checks on government in addition to the 
external checks imposed by legislatures, courts, and the public.16  This 
system of internal checks is even more crucial as traditional checks of 
executive power have grown weaker over time.17  Robust protection of 
                                                                                                                          
15 Clyde W. Summers, Employment At Will in the United States: The Divine Right of Employers, 
3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 65, 78 (2000). 
16 See infra Part IV.C. 
17 See, e.g., THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, THE BROKEN BRANCH: HOW CONGRESS 
IS FAILING AMERICA AND HOW TO GET IT BACK ON TRACK 40–41 (2006) (describing the twentieth-
century rise in power of the executive, affecting Congress’s responsibility to check the executive and 
“respond to its ascendant rival”); Brian D. Feinstein, Avoiding Oversight: Legislator Preferences and 
Congressional Monitoring of the Administrative State, 8 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 23, 25 (2011) (“Congress 
continues to grapple with the interrelated issues of how best to exert control over administrative 
agencies and counter the President’s strengthened hand.”); Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 
114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2246, 2248 (2001) (acknowledging the power of the President in the “era of 
presidential administration”). 
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public employee speech thus has the potential to compensate for the 
concomitant loss of monitoring by other branches and agents. 
Part II surveys and critiques a century of public employee speech 
doctrine.  I show that ever since the Court’s 1968 high point in Pickering v.   
Board of Education,18 public employees have seen their free speech rights 
dwindle, the lowest point being the Court’s recent decision in Garcetti v.   
Ceballos.19  Garcetti, I argue, has brought constitutional protection close to 
its nineteenth-century level, when public employees enjoyed no 
constitutional protection for their speech and were considered no different 
than private employees. 
Taking a sweeping view of developments in government organization, 
Part III develops the public/private convergence thesis in three sections.  
First, I interpret the retrenchment in public employee speech rights as an 
undeclared attempt to equalize the speech rights of private employees with 
those of public employees.  The underlying reason for this convergence—
one which is rarely made explicit—is that despite lofty rhetoric, the 
Supreme Court now sees little difference between the two.  The Article 
then seeks to understand the decline in public employee speech against the 
background of two larger transformations in government work: 
privatization and civil service reforms at the sub-national level.  
Privatization and outsourcing by government suggest not only that firms 
can perform tasks that were previously reserved for government, but that 
there is no difference between private and public employees.  Civil service 
reforms at the sub-national level have either eliminated or eroded 
traditional protections for public employees.  Thousands of employees 
have been converted to the status of employment at will, and several states 
now hire only at-will employees, the paradigm of private sector 
employment relations.  Thus, whereas privatization is a movement from 
government to market, civil service reforms are a movement from market 
to government. 
The Article connects these seemingly disparate phenomena and for the 
first time links them to the declining protection of public employee speech. 
It demonstrates how structural changes in government organization 
generate constitutional implications.  Privatization and outsourcing by the 
government mean that the private sector is engaged in government work, 
yet private sector employees do not enjoy constitutional protection when 
they speak about their work.  With fewer public employees performing 
these jobs, there is a net loss of valuable speech that can inform the public 
and government itself about the government.  By stripping protections 
from public employees and converting them to at-will status, civil service 
                                                                                                                          
18 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
19 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
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reforms create a chilling effect.  Employees will be less likely to speak 
about government and express valuable dissent if their job is on the line. 
Part IV therefore rejects the public/private convergence by mounting 
an argument in favor of public/private divergence.  The importation of 
market norms into government work, the loss of public service ethic, and 
the erosion of a system of internal checks on government power overlook 
the unique role of the state vis-à-vis the market and the unique role of 
public employees, both in terms of their job duties and in terms of their 
role in a democratic society that values transparency, accountability, and 
dissent. 
At times, the Court seems to be aware of the rationales privileging 
public employee speech.  Yet there is a mismatch between the First 
Amendment values that support public employee speech, namely the 
contribution to democratic self-government, and the doctrinal rules that the 
Court has created to advance these values.  Similarly, the Court 
misapprehends how government bureaucracies operate by overlooking 
social science research demonstrating that workplaces are already geared 
toward suppressing dissent.  Dissent levels, as determined by the Court, are 
therefore suboptimal and bolster pre-existing silencing tendencies.  Finally, 
whereas the Court’s emphasis on disruption and efficiency as grounds to 
suppress speech is the most explicit importation of private sector logic, it 
overlooks how employers often overestimate the possibility of disruption 
when they perceive challenges to their authority.  The Court, on its part, 
overestimates the possibility of being flooded with employee suits. 
Protecting public employee speech also raises concerns.  Such speech 
may not be sufficiently valuable to warrant constitutional protection.  Some 
may argue that there are ample sources to acquire information about 
government, making employee speech redundant.  Moreover, protecting 
such speech might cause disruptions in the government workplace and 
generate inefficiencies that, on balance, militate against protection.  Even 
those who favor protection may believe that constitutional protection goes 
too far given extant whistleblower statutes and common law safeguards 
that purport to protect employee speech when it matters most.  Others may 
be troubled by the prospect of excessive judicial intervention in the 
operation of the workplace.  Part IV ends by discussing, and ultimately 
rejecting, these objections. 
Responding to the normative concerns, Part V elaborates on the 
proposed project of public/private divergence.  I offer two possible 
directions for reform.  The first proposal seeks to resolve the problems with 
the Court’s jurisprudence by offering specific doctrinal reforms, the main 
one being a return to the Pickering framework with several adjustments.  
The second proposal focuses on the public workplace and on the possibility 
of utilizing internal regulatory mechanisms to protect and encourage 
valuable speech.  While the first proposal is possible, it is unlikely to be 
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realized in the near future given the Court’s composition.  The second 
proposal seeks to avoid costly and often inefficacious litigation, but it too 
comes at price; namely, the pitfalls of self-regulation and the lack of 
meaningful monitoring through judicial review.  My main objective, 
however, is to uncover the larger forces that shape public employee speech 
doctrine and to embark on an alternative normative path.20 
II.  BACK TO THE PAST:  A CENTURY OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEE SPEECH 
A.  The Competing Values 
The First Amendment applies differently in the public workplace than 
it does in public discourse.  Whereas our speech is largely free from 
government regulation as citizens, it is not unconstrained if we work for 
the government.  Although government generally may not impose content 
and viewpoint based restrictions on speech, it can, as an employer, impose 
such restrictions that are viewed as necessary for the promotion of 
government’s own speech.21  The difficulty in public employment law 
stems from the fact that government is occupying different roles, each with 
corresponding rights and powers.  As a sovereign it is significantly limited 
in its control of speech, but as an employer it can demand that employees 
perform their jobs, which includes control of their speech.22 
But in controlling its employees’ speech to further its own mission, 
government runs the risk of trampling on two expressive interests: those 
employees have as speakers, and those society and government have as 
listeners.  The importance of public employee speech lies in its ability to 
advance First Amendment values that contribute to republican government.  
This speech increases government transparency by often revealing details 
about government work that are otherwise unavailable or difficult to 
obtain.23  Such speech can expose government waste, fraud, abuse, or other 
illegalities, facilitating the public’s ability to hold government politically 
                                                                                                                          
20 At no point do I argue that current protections for private employee speech are optimal.  Taking 
the status of private employees as given, my objective is to prevent the slide in public employee speech 
rights. 
21 This is the government speech doctrine, which is a defense against government infringement of 
free speech.  See infra note 127 and accompanying text. 
22 See Robert C. Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 151, 164 (1996) (arguing that “[w]ithin 
managerial domains, the state organizes its resources so as to achieve specified ends”); Paul M. 
Secunda, Garcetti’s Impact on the First Amendment Speech Rights of Federal Employees, 7 FIRST 
AMEND. L. REV. 117, 120 (2008) (“The government as sovereign generally may not punish citizens for 
the content of their speech, but the government as employer may demand that employees do the job 
they were hired to do, and insofar as effective performance of that job requires saying some things and 
not others, it can control their speech.”). 
23 See, e.g., Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 572 (1968) (“Teachers are, as a class, the 
members of a community most likely to have informed and definite opinions as to how funds allotted to 
the operation of the schools should be spent.”). 
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accountable.24  Finally, public employee speech facilitates dissent from 
official policy.  It introduces dissenting views of those who are part of the 
policymaking process, often as enforcers and implementers.  This is the 
type of speech least likely to be heard inside and outside of government, 
despite providing crucial insights about the management of government 
programs and institutions.  For employers, a climate where employees feel 
safe to speak out about government policy not only improves intra-
government communication, but also informs government itself about 
problems with particular policies.  On this view, public employee speech 
operates as a signaling mechanism for problems down the chain of 
command.  This is doubly important in light of the difficulty of expressing 
opinions in hierarchical settings, which is the prevalent structure of 
government organizations. 
Thus, the position advanced in this Article is not that public employee 
speech is valuable for autonomy, liberty, or marketplace of ideas 
rationales, though it can be tangentially related to those.  It is most 
defensible when it can be justified on rationales of democratic self-
government.  The unique institutional location of public employees—their 
comparative advantage over ordinary citizens—makes them especially able 
to contribute toward that end.  On this view, constitutional protection is 
justified both when the speech is expressed internally, in government, and 
externally, outside government. 
At the same time, protecting public employee speech can disrupt the 
smooth operation of government.  Employees may make false accusations, 
misunderstand particular policies, or raise grievances that have little 
constitutional value.  Dissenting speech can undermine the government’s 
ability to communicate a clear and coherent message and reduce the 
government’s ability to control its institutions.  The Court’s public 
employee speech doctrine attempts to balance the conflicting interests.  
Indeed, the competing interests explain the differential protection for 
speech in work and non-work settings.  They fail, however, to explain the 
shift in protection over the past century.  This Part traces the development 
of public employee speech doctrine, arguing that the consistent decline in 
constitutional protection should be viewed not only as a de facto return to 
its nineteenth century level, when no protection was extended to such 
speech, but also as part of a larger theme of converging the speech rights of 
public employees with those of private employees. 
B.  The Doctrinal Landscape:  1892−2012 
The origin of public employee speech doctrine dates back to Justice 
Holmes in 1892, when he was serving on the Supreme Judicial Court of 
                                                                                                                          
24 See infra Part IV.C. 
 10 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:1 
Massachusetts.  In McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford,25 a policeman was 
fired for engaging in political canvassing.26  Dismissing the policeman’s 
suit, Holmes stated that “[the policeman] may have a constitutional right to 
talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman.”27  By 
accepting public employment (much like private employment), the 
policeman waived his constitutional rights and the city was free to impose 
“any reasonable condition upon holding offices within its control.”28 
The Holmesian conception was premised on the decoupling of the 
government’s power as a sovereign and as an employer.  What the 
government could not do as a sovereign it could do as an employer.29  
Holmes assumed that employers, not courts, best know how to manage 
their organizations, and therefore, they should have discretion to control 
their employees’ speech.30  McAuliffe thus introduced the rights/privilege 
distinction; whatever constitutional rights individuals may have as citizens, 
public employment is a “privilege” and may be subject to restrictions that 
would otherwise be unconstitutional if applied to citizens generally.31 
The rights/privilege distinction dominated into the 1960s,32 until its 
repudiation in Pickering v. Board of Education, the high point of modern 
public employee speech doctrine.  In Pickering, a public school teacher 
was fired after writing a letter to the editor of a local newspaper criticizing 
the local board of education for supporting a series of tax referenda.33  
Although the Court rejected the rights/privilege distinction,34 it recognized 
that the state has important interests in regulating its employees’ speech.35  
It therefore introduced a balancing test, balancing the interests of the public 
employee, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern, and 
                                                                                                                          
25 29 N.E. 517 (Mass. 1892). 
26 Id. at 517. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 518.  
29 See id. at 517 (“[T]here is nothing in the constitution or the statute to prevent the city from 
attaching obedience to [the rule at issue] as a condition to the office of policeman, and making it part of 
the good conduct required.”).  For a development of this point, see Randy J. Kozel, Reconceptualizing 
Public Employee Speech, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1007, 1029 (2005) (acknowledging that “the government 
as sovereign regulator of private conduct is limited by the First Amendment in its ability to restrict 
citizen speech, but when the government steps out of its role as sovereign and into its role as employer, 
it transcends these limitations”). 
30 Kozel, supra note 29, at 1031–32. 
31 JOSEPH R. GRODIN ET AL., PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS 23 (2004). 
32 The distinction began to unravel in Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485 (1952).  The 
dissent from Justice Douglas, who was joined by Justice Black, dismissed the utility of the 
employer/sovereign distinction, arguing that citizens should not forgo their constitutional rights in 
virtue of their public employment.  See id. at 508 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“I cannot for example find 
in our constitutional scheme the power of a state to place its employees in the category of second-class 
citizens by denying them freedom of thought and expression.”). 
33 391 U.S. 563, 566 (1968). 
34 Id. at 568–69. 
35 Id. at 568. 
 2013] PUBLIC EMPLOYEE FREE SPEECH 11 
the interests of the state, as an employer, in promoting the effective 
delivery of public services.36 
Pickering represented a marked shift: from no protection under the 
Holmesian regime, to the recognition that public employees play a valuable 
role in informing the public of government conduct and are best positioned 
to do so because of their access to governmental decision-making.37  
However, Pickering did not specify what counts as speech on a matter of 
public concern.  In Connick v. Myers,38 the Court explained that “[w]hether 
an employee’s speech addresses a matter of public concern must be 
determined by the content, form, and context of a given statement, as 
revealed by the whole record.”39  In Connick, an assistant district attorney, 
upon learning that she would be transferred to a different office, circulated 
a questionnaire to her colleagues asking about their experience with their 
job transfers, including whether any worker was pressured to work in a 
political campaign on behalf of a candidate supported by the office.40  
Upholding her dismissal, the Court reasoned that the questionnaire touched 
on matters of public concern in only a limited sense.41  Even though no 
disruption was caused, the employer’s belief that there would be, coupled 
with the absence of public concern, removed any possible constitutional 
protection.42 
The result of these two cases was the Connick/Pickering analysis.  
First, the Court must determine if the speech relates to a matter of public 
concern.  If the answer is yes, then the speech is balanced against the 
government’s countervailing interest in efficiency and non-disruption.  
Connick thus made “public concern” a threshold issue,43 while failing to 
define it.44 
                                                                                                                          
36 Id. 
37 This was the formal end of the rights/privilege distinction, predicted by Professor William W. 
Van Alstyne in an article he published one month prior to the Pickering decision.  William W. Van 
Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439, 
1461–62 (1968).  
38 461 U.S. 138 (1983). 
39 Id. at 147–48. 
40 Id. at 140–41. 
41 Id. at 154. 
42 Id. 
43 See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384 (1987) (making public concern a “threshold 
question”); Cynthia L. Estlund, Speech on Matters of Public Concern: The Perils of an Emerging First 
Amendment Category, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 8 (1990) (asserting that although “Connick might be 
seen as simply articulating what was implicit in Pickering . . . there is no doubt that Connick recast the 
Pickering balance”). 
44 See, e.g., Stephen Allred, From Connick to Confusion: The Struggle to Define Speech on 
Matters of Public Concern, 64 IND. L.J. 43, 44 (1988) (examining decisions of the courts since Connick 
to predict when an employee’s speech pertains to a public concern).  This problem plagued lower court 
cases that invoked the public concern test to deny constitutional protection.  See, e.g., Toni M. Massaro, 
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Connick signaled a retreat from Pickering’s more expansive approach, 
but it was not an aberration.  In Mt. Healthy School District Board of 
Education v. Doyle,45 the Court held that the burden was on the public 
employee to prove that her speech was the motivating factor for 
retaliation.46  To rebut the employee’s claim, the employer had to show that 
the adverse action would have occurred regardless of the speech.47  This 
made it easier for employers to retaliate against dissenting speech because 
of the ease in concocting reasons for adverse action.48  Importantly, the 
“motivating factor” test was imported from the private sector of 
employment law litigation, where it was often applied in “mixed-motive” 
discrimination cases.49  Then, in Waters v. Churchill,50 the Court 
announced a broad rule of deference to the employer.  In Waters, a nurse, 
in a private conversation, criticized hospital policy that she believed placed 
patient care at risk.51  The Court held that it would defer to the employer 
when it made a sensible prediction about likely disruption, even on issues 
of public concern.52 
Mt. Healthy and Waters reveal how the Court views public employees 
and the organizations in which they work.  By granting public managers 
broad discretion to limit individual rights, as long as those limitations 
further government’s pursuit of efficient management,53 the Court 
expressed a view of government organizations that is close, if not identical, 
to private firms, where constitutional rights cannot be invoked because of 
the absence of state action.  Despite acknowledging that “[g]overnment 
employees are often in the best position to know what ails the agencies for 
which they work,”54 the Court privileged employer interests and the 
                                                                                                                          
Significant Silences: Freedom of Speech in the Public Sector Workplace, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 20–21 
n.95 (1987) (citing cases). 
45 429 U.S. 274 (1977). 
46 Id. at 287. 
47 Id. at 285. 
48 See, e.g., Michael L. Wells, Section 1983, the First Amendment, and Public Employee Speech: 
Shaping the Right to Fit the Remedy (and Vice Versa), 35 GA. L. REV. 939, 1012 (2001) (noting that the 
Mt. Healthy test “creates the risk that the defendant will prevail whenever some other reason is 
sufficient to justify the adverse employment action”). 
49 See TIMOTHY P. GLYNN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW: PRIVATE ORDERING AND ITS LIMITATIONS 
224–25 (2007) (noting that under Title VII, “discriminatory intent can be a ‘motivating factor’ . . . even 
if the trier of fact ultimately concludes that the employer would have made the ‘same decision’ even 
had it not been motivated by the prohibited consideration”). 
50 511 U.S. 661 (1994). 
51 Id. at 664–65.  In an earlier case, the Court held that private conversations can also be 
constitutionally protected.  See Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 415–16 (1979) 
(reasoning that a teacher’s private criticism to her principal regarding the school’s desegregation policy 
was a matter of public concern). 
52 Waters, 511 U.S. at 673. 
53 Kermit Roosevelt, Note, The Costs of Agencies: Waters v. Churchill and the First Amendment 
in the Administrative State, 106 YALE L.J. 1233, 1234 (1997). 
54 Waters, 511 U.S. at 674. 
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employer’s perception of the employee’s speech, even if the employer is 
mistaken about what the employee said.55 
One consequence of Waters allowed managers to make ad hoc 
dismissals without employees violating any regulations, which was 
equivalent to the situation of private sector at-will employees.56  A second 
consequence was the focus on disruption.  When speech disrupts the 
workplace, it is not protected, yet the Court did not explain what counts as 
disruption and why it should be guarded against.  In fact, the public 
employee speech cases are remarkable in that the Court consistently 
upholds employers’ actions even when no disruption occurred.  
Presumably disruption is negatively associated with the delivery of public 
services, and is thus linked with efficiency.  But rather than examine 
whether disruption occurred, or whether such disruption can be beneficial, 
the Court defers to what the employer believes might happen.57  This 
resonates with the Holmesian model, which assumed that employers, not 
the court, best know how to manage their organizations, and it is in line 
with the private sector rule assigning the employer the financial risk for 
success of the business. 
To be sure, public employees occasionally prevail, but in interesting 
ways—notably when the speech does not take place on the job and is not 
job-related.  In United States v. National Treasury Employees Union 
(NTEU),58 the Court struck down a provision that prohibited federal 
employees from accepting honoraria for speech-related activity such as 
public speaking or writing articles.59  As the Court noted, the activity for 
which the employees had received payments concerned matters that were 
not related to the employees’ official duties and were not paid by groups 
connected to employees’ official responsibilities; hence, there was no 
disruption to government operations.60  NTEU reveals, however, the gap 
between the Court’s professed ideals and the doctrinal reality put in place 
to realize them.  Although the Court insists that the raison d’être of public 
employee speech is providing information about government conduct,61 it 
is most generous in First Amendment protection where employees are the 
                                                                                                                          
55 As the Court reasoned, employers often rely on hearsay, which would make subjecting 
employees to a judicial-type scrutiny of the truth unreasonable.  Id. at 676. 
56 For a discussion of private sector employee speech rights, see Cynthia L. Estlund, Free Speech 
and Due Process in the Workplace, 71 IND. L.J. 101, 117–18 (1995). 
57 The deference is often explained as a reluctance to interfere in the internal management of other 
institutions and is grounded in courts’ institutional limitations and agencies’ superior expertise.  Gia B. 
Lee, First Amendment in Government Institutions and Programs, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1691, 1717–23 
(2009). 
58 513 U.S. 454 (1995). 
59 See id. at 457 (striking down part of the Ethics Reform Act of 1989). 
60 Id. at 472–73. 
61 See San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 82 (2004) (“Were [public employees] not able to speak on 
these matters, the community would be deprived of informed opinions on important public issues.”). 
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most removed from their jobs and institutional locations. 
Like other speech-protective cases, NTEU’s holding has come under 
pressure.   In San Diego v. Roe, the Court upheld a dismissal for off duty 
speech (in this case, a police officer filming himself in sexual acts while 
wearing a generic police uniform) that exploited the government’s image 
and thus “brought the mission of the employer and the professionalism of 
its officers into serious disrepute.”62  Roe’s speech was harmful not 
because it compromised his ability to do his job, but because it reflected 
poorly on government as a whole.  In other words, the Court narrowed the 
scope of protected speech when that speech could cause the government to 
be perceived as endorsing the employee’s message because of its 
association with the employee.63  Notice again, the resemblance to the 
private sector rule of at-will employment that would ordinarily not bar 
retaliatory action because of the employer’s need to maintain a certain 
image and reputation.64 
Despite this decline in protection, public employees still had speech 
rights when they spoke about issues of public concern, unless those were 
outweighed by disruption and efficiency considerations.  That principle, 
however, received a serious blow in Garcetti v. Ceballos, where the Court 
held that speech made “pursuant to . . . official duties” receives no 
constitutional protection.65  Ceballos, a deputy district attorney in Los 
Angeles County, responded to an inquiry by a defense attorney who 
planned to challenge a search warrant.66  Upon investigating, Ceballos 
concluded that the affidavit submitted by the police to secure the warrant 
contained serious misrepresentations.67  He recommended the case be 
dismissed, but his superiors decided to proceed.68  Ceballos was 
subpoenaed to testify on behalf of the defense, and although the judge 
accepted his claims about misrepresentation, the case was allowed to 
proceed on other grounds.69  Subsequently, Ceballos claimed that he was 
subject to a series of retaliatory measures.70 
                                                                                                                          
62 Id. at 81. 
63 See Helen Norton, Constraining Public Employee Speech: Government’s Control of Its 
Workers’ Speech to Protect Its Own Expression, 59 DUKE L.J. 1, 16 (2009) (“[C]ourts increasingly 
hold that government may also control even its workers’ off-duty speech to protect its own expressive 
interests.”). 
64 See, e.g., BRUCE BARRY, SPEECHLESS: THE EROSION OF FREE EXPRESSION IN THE AMERICAN 
WORKPLACE 140–41 (2007) (describing a case of termination based on off-work, non-work-related 
speech). 
65 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006). 
66 Id. at 413–14. 
67 Id. at 414. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 414–15. 
70 Id. at 415.  Those retaliatory measures “included reassignment from his calendar deputy 
position to a trial deputy position, transfer to another courthouse, and denial of a promotion.”  Id. 
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In a 5–4 decision authored by Justice Kennedy, the Court argued that 
the operative distinction was whether the employee was speaking as a 
citizen or as an employee.71  Pickering, the Court said, only protected the 
right of the public employee to speak as a citizen on a matter of public 
concern, 72 but Ceballos spoke as an employee.73  A person can speak either 
as an employee or as a citizen, but not both, no matter the seriousness or 
gravity of the issue or the intensity of the public’s interest.  Consequently, 
when public employees make statements “pursuant to their official duties” 
they are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and are 
therefore not protected from employer discipline.74 
Although the Court could have grounded its decision in concerns about 
political accountability, the heart of its reasoning was couched in economic 
terms that relied on private-sector logic.  The Court reasoned that the 
speech does not belong to the employee and therefore the employer cannot 
infringe upon any liberties the employee would have enjoyed as a private 
citizen.  The speech belongs to the government because it commissioned it 
from the employee, i.e., paid for it.75 
Troubled by the elasticity of Pickering/Connick balancing, the Court 
created a bright-line rule that would preempt a wide range of statements 
from constitutional protection.76  In the course of doing so, however, four 
problems emerged.  First, the Court failed to define what counts as 
speaking “pursuant to official duties,” making the term open to employer 
manipulation.77  Indeed, lower courts are divided on what “official duties” 
means, putting to rest the Court’s desire to end litigation and excessive 
judicial intervention.78 
                                                                                                                          
71 Id. at 417–18. 
72 Id. at 418. 
73 Id. at 421–22. 
74 Id. at 421. 
75 See id. at 421–22 (“Restricting speech that owes its existence to a public employee’s 
professional responsibilities does not infringe any liberties the employee might have enjoyed as a 
private citizen.  It simply reflects the exercise of employer control over what the employer itself has 
commissioned or created.”). 
76 See, e.g., Barry P. McDonald, The Emerging Oversimplifications of the Government Speech 
Doctrine: From Substantive Content to a “Jurisprudence of Labels,” 2010 BYU L. REV. 2071, 2091 
(explaining how the Court veered from the previous balancing of interests analysis); see also Charles 
W. “Rocky” Rhodes, Public Employee Speech Rights Fall Prey to an Emerging Doctrinal Formalism, 
15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1173, 1203 & n.216 (2007) (noting Justice Kennedy’s general objections 
to formalism and distaste for decisions where a “categorical bright-line rule prevail[s] over interest 
balancing”). 
77 See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 431 n.2 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“I am pessimistic enough to expect 
that one response to the Court’s holding will be moves by government employers to expand stated job 
descriptions to include more official duties and so exclude even some currently protectable speech from 
First Amendment purview.”).  In response, the Court said the examination would be a practical one and 
guard against self-serving definitions.  Id. at 424–25 (majority opinion). 
78 See, e.g., Scott R. Bauries & Patrick Schach, Coloring Outside the Lines: Garcetti v. Ceballos 
in the Federal Appellate Courts, 262 EDUC. L. REP. 357, 358 (2011) (“[T]he scope of the Garcetti 
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Second, even if the interpretive question of official duties were 
resolved, Garcetti fails to protect employees whose job duties are to report 
on governmental wrongdoing.  Indeed, the post-Garcetti landscape has 
enabled dismissals of many such employees.79  This is a Catch-22.  If 
employees fail to speak, they risk termination for not doing their job; but if 
they do their job and report wrongdoing, they risk termination for that very 
act.80 
Third, speech on matters of public concern is no longer protected if it 
was made pursuant to official duties.  Garcetti protects speech depending 
on the context in which it was made, whereas prior to the ruling the Court 
focused on whether the statement was on a matter of public concern.81  For 
example, in Vose v. Kliment,82 a police officer reported internally to his 
superiors on the misconduct of other officers and was eventually forced to 
resign.83  Relying on Garcetti, the Seventh Circuit denied the officer’s First 
Amendment claim, insinuating that had the officer spoken externally to the 
media, outside his “official duties,” his statements may have been 
protected.84 
                                                                                                                          
exemption has apparently caused some confusion in the lower courts.”); Christine Elzer, The “Official 
Duties” Puzzle: Lower Courts’ Struggle with First Amendment Protection for Public Employees After 
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 69 U. PITT. L. REV. 367, 368 (2007) (“The lower courts’ efforts to apply 
Garcetti’s categorical holding to various fact scenarios have resulted in some puzzling outcomes that 
seem to have raised more questions than Garcetti purported to settle.”).  
79 See, e.g., Carter v. Inc. Vill. of Ocean Beach, 415 F. App’x 290, 293 (2d Cir. 2011) (finding 
that reporting police officer misconduct up the chain of command is part of an official duty); Bonn v. 
City of Omaha, 623 F.3d 587, 588 (8th Cir. 2010) (upholding the dismissal of a public safety auditor 
who published a report that was critical of the police’s interactions with the black community); Green 
v. Barrett, 226 F. App’x 883, 884, 886 (11th Cir. 2007) (upholding the dismissal of a jailer who 
testified that prison conditions were unsafe); Battle v. Bd. of Regents for Ga., 468 F.3d 755, 763 (11th 
Cir. 2006) (upholding the dismissal of a financial aid officer who reported on noncompliance with 
grants); DePrado v. City of Miami, 446 F. Supp. 2d 1344, 1346 (S.D. Fla. 2006) (finding that testifying 
at a grand jury is part of a police officer’s official duties). 
80 The Supreme Court recently passed up opportunities to resolve this Catch-22 when it denied 
certiorari in Jackler v. Byrne and Bowie v. Maddox.  See Jackler v. Byrne, 658 F.3d 225, 245 (2d Cir. 
2011) (splitting on whether employees have First Amendment rights when refusing to file false reports 
ordered by their superiors), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1634 (2012); Bowie v. Maddox, 642 F.3d 1122, 
1133–34 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (declining to address the question of whether an employee had a First 
Amendment right to refuse to sign an allegedly false affidavit as ordered by his superior), cert. denied, 
132 S. Ct. 1636 (2012). 
81 The Garcetti approach is the opposite of Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School Dist., 
439 U.S. 410 (1979), which held that public concern, not context, is controlling.  See id. at 414 (stating 
that the rule to be derived from Pickering and Mt. Healthy is not dependent on those views being 
expressed publicly or privately). 
82 506 F.3d 565 (7th Cir. 2007). 
83 Id. at 566–67. 
84 Id. at 569, 572.  This is far from settled, however, since employees have been disciplined for 
speaking to the media, even if it was in their capacity as “citizens.”  Robert E. Drechsel, The Declining 
First Amendment Rights of Government News Sources: How Garcetti v. Ceballos Threatens the Flow of 
Newsworthy Information, 16 COMM. L. & POL’Y. 129, 147 (2011). 
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Although context matters for balancing,85 the Court now treats it as 
outcome-determinative.  The problem is that the internal/external 
distinction ignores workplace realities.  Sometimes employees report 
internally and sometimes externally, for example where the superiors 
themselves are complicit in the wrongdoing or where they share the views 
of those the employee speaks against.  The decision how to report is 
contextual and depends on the severity of the wrongdoing or disagreement, 
the fear of retaliation, the organizational culture, the employee’s status, and 
a host of other factors not included in the Court’s rigid formulation.86  
Ironically, going outside may create much more disruption than internal 
reporting, so the Court’s desire to prevent disruption is undermined by its 
insistence that going outside is more likely to warrant the “citizen” label.87 
Finally, Garcetti leads to situations where the same content is 
protected when made by an employee removed from the issue (since the 
speech will not be pursuant to an official duty), while not protected when 
made by an official who is acting pursuant to an official duty.  Yet officials 
who are not acting pursuant to an official duty are less likely to know about 
the issue and are therefore less likely to speak in the first place.  In effect, 
Garcetti can stifle dissent completely because it prevents the people who 
are most informed from speaking out.  While employees who are not close 
to the issue may be able to speak “as citizens,” the value of their speech 
will be lower.  Therefore, there is a mismatch between the First 
Amendment values that support public employee speech and the doctrinal 
rules that the Court has created to advance these values. 
C.  From Holmes to Holmes 
Where do we stand today?  It turns out we stand close to Justice 
Holmes in McAuliffe in 1892.  True, Pickering repudiated the idea that 
government employment is a privilege and therefore can be conditioned by 
terms that are otherwise unconstitutional.  But Pickering, it turns out, was 
the aberration.  In almost every case since, the Court has narrowed the 
constitutional protections it afforded public employees.  Indeed, while 
                                                                                                                          
85 See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147–48 (1983) (“Whether an employee’s speech 
addresses a matter of public concern must be determined by the content, form, and context of a given 
statement, as revealed by the whole record.”). 
86 See, e.g., Yuval Feldman & Orly Lobel, Decentralized Enforcement in Organizations: An 
Experimental Approach, 2 REG. & GOVERNANCE 165, 166 (2008) (presenting findings of a study that 
focuses on whistleblowing and predicts “the conditions under which individuals confront illegalities 
they witness in their workplace”).  The internal/external distinction builds on economist Albert 
Hirschman’s work on voice and exit.  See generally ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND 
LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970). 
87 See Davis v. McKinney, 518 F.3d 304, 313 (5th Cir. 2008) (raising concerns up the chain of 
command at the workplace about job duties constitutes speech undertaken in the course of performing 
an official duty). 
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Garcetti was subject to much scholarly criticism, that literature overlooked 
the fact that Garcetti simply confirmed a trend that was almost forty years 
in the making.88 
To see the de-facto return to the Holmesian model, let us compare the 
speech rights public employees had during three different periods.89 
TABLE 1  
Public 
Employee 
Speech 
1892–1968 
McAuliffe 
1968–2004  
Pickering, 
Connick, 
NTEU 
2006–Present 
San Diego v.   
Roe, Garcetti 
Off the job, 
non-job related 
speech 
Not protected Protected (NTEU) 
Protected 
(NTEU), unless 
speech is 
negatively 
associated with 
public employer 
(San Diego v.   
Roe) 
Off the job, job 
related speech Undecided 
Pickering 
balance 
Not if part of 
official duties.   
Otherwise 
Pickering 
balance. 
Off the job, 
speech on 
matters of 
public concern 
Not protected Pickering balance 
Not if part of 
official duties.   
Otherwise 
Pickering 
balance. 
                                                                                                                          
88 For criticisms of Garcetti, see Cynthia Estlund, Harmonizing Work and Citizenship: A Due 
Process Solution to a First Amendment Problem, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 115, 144–53; Sheldon H. 
Nahmod, Public Employee Speech, Categorical Balancing and § 1983: A Critique of Garcetti v. 
Ceballos, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 561 (2008); Rhodes, supra note 76; Secunda, supra note 22; Julie A. 
Wenell, Note, Garcetti v. Ceballos: Stifling the First Amendment in the Public Workplace, 16 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 623 (2007). 
89 Paul Secunda believes that the reemergence of the rights/privilege distinction is attributable to 
the Court’s understanding of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, viewing government employment 
similarly to the government choosing to fund one speech activity over another.  Secunda, supra note 
14, at 913–14.  I agree with Secunda’s interpretation, but this Article advances a broader argument for 
the reemergence of the distinction. 
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Public 
Employee 
Speech 
1892–1968 
McAuliffe 
1968–2004  
Pickering, 
Connick, 
NTEU 
2006–Present 
San Diego v.   
Roe, Garcetti 
On the job, non-
job related 
speech 
Undecided; 
likely not 
protected 
Not protected 
(Connick) 
Not protected 
(Connick) 
On the job, job-
related speech 
not on matters 
of public 
concern 
Not protected Not protected (Connick) 
Not protected 
(Connick) 
On the job 
speech on 
matters of 
public concern 
Not protected Pickering balance 
Not if part of 
official duties.   
Otherwise 
Pickering 
balance 
Speech that is 
the job, 
regardless of 
where it was 
spoken 
Undecided Undecided Not protected (Garcetti) 
 
Today, public employees have no constitutional protection for speech 
pursuant to official duties.90  Such speech can be interpreted broadly to 
encompass speech that otherwise would have benefited from a Pickering 
analysis—now precluded as a threshold matter.  Lack of protection is 
exacerbated by cases such as Mt. Healthy v. Doyle and Waters v. Churchill, 
which stand for the proposition that courts should be deferential to 
employers’ decisions even if the speech raises matters of public concern.91 
The overall decline in constitutional protection raises four problems, 
three of which have already been identified.  First, protection is granted 
based on whether the employee spoke as a “citizen” or as an “employee.”92  
                                                                                                                          
90 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S 410, 421 (2006). 
91 United States v. NTEU, 513 U.S. 454, 492 (1995) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (“In conducting 
this balance, we consistently have given substantial weight to government employers’ reasonable 
predictions of disruption, even when the speech involved was on a matter of public concern.”). 
92 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418. 
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Despite past language recognizing the duality,93 today’s Court does not 
believe that the two can co-exist.  Second, the Court has embraced the 
internal/external distinction, where speech outside the job is likely to 
warrant the “citizen” label and hence receive more protection.94  This 
results in under-protection of valuable speech from the perspective of the 
First Amendment.  Third, the Court understands disruption and efficiency 
in terms that ignore whether disruption actually occurred and whether 
efficiency was actually compromised.95  Finally, even though each public 
employee case dealt with a different type of employee (teacher, nurse, 
police officer, prosecutor, etc.),96 the Court assumes that all public 
employees are similarly situated, that each institution should be governed 
by the same rules, and implicitly, that each institution seeks the same goals.  
This doctrinal uniformity ignores government’s institutional diversity.  I 
return to these problems in Part V.   
III.  PUBLIC/PRIVATE CONVERGENCE 
What accounts for the decline in public employee speech rights?  This 
Part unfolds in three sections, maintaining that the decline should be 
viewed in light of the public/private convergence thesis.  First, I argue that 
the Court has been scaling back constitutional protections because it has 
implicitly come to view public employees as private employees for 
purposes of speech.  Second, I maintain that the erosion in employee 
speech rights is but one aspect of a general convergence between public 
sector employees and private sector employees.  This convergence is 
driven by increased government privatization, outsourcing, and various 
state civil service reforms.  The Court’s public employee speech doctrine, 
while not explicitly a part of this convergence, nevertheless reflects the 
conception that government employees should be treated like private sector 
employees.  Third, I show how these developments result in less speech 
and less protected speech.  To be clear, I am not making a causal claim that 
because of privatization and civil service reforms the Court altered its 
public employee speech doctrine.  My claim is that there is a correlation 
between these phenomena because they are driven by the same underlying 
                                                                                                                          
93 See City of Madison Joint Sch. Dist. No. 8 v. Wis. Emp’t Relations Comm’n, 429 U.S. 167, 
176 n.11 (1976) (recognizing that teachers can speak both as citizens and employees). 
94 The strongest evidence for this is NTEU, 513 U.S. at 454.  
95 Professor Kozel has argued that the disruption test constitutionalizes a “heckler’s veto,” since 
the speech right becomes “dependent on the likely reaction of co-workers and the public to the 
employee’s speech.”  Kozel, supra note 29, at 1019; see also Randy J. Kozel, Free Speech and Parity: 
A Theory of Public Employee Rights, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1985, 2019 (2012) (“Through its 
contemplation of scenarios in which the disruption caused by speech provides a lawful basis for 
discipline, the Pickering test can be understood as constitutionalizing a ‘heckler’s veto’ for 
controversial expressions.”). 
96 See supra Part II.B. 
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economic logic.  This correlation is strengthened when we consider that: 
(a) the moves I describe happened around the same time; and (b) 
proponents of privatization and civil reforms often employ the same 
language that is used by the Court in its public employee decisions, namely 
the emphasis on efficiency, managerial flexibility and control, and office 
performance.  These similarities suggest that the parallels between public 
employee doctrine and governmental organization are not accidental. 
A.  The Equalization of Public and Private Employee Speech 
Because the Constitution only protects against state action,97 private 
employees have no constitutional speech rights.98  The background rule for 
employment relations in the private sector is employment at will.  Briefly 
stated, employers have the right to fire their employees at will, with no 
notice, for good or bad reasons, or for no reasons at all.99  Employment at 
will stresses employers’ property interest in the workplace.100  Employers 
assume risks that are entailed in a competitive market, and correlatively the 
law grants them discretion to manage their businesses as they see fit, albeit 
with some exceptions.101  The rationale undergirding employment at will is 
that the employer owns the job along with the property right to control its 
conditions and the type of people who fill it.  Although the employment at 
will rule has been eroded by statutes and common law exceptions that give 
employees greater protection from retaliation,102 it is still the background 
rule and the prevailing ideological norm.103  Common law and statutory 
deviations from the rule are the exceptions that are superimposed on the 
dominant at-will paradigm. 
The public policy exception is a paradigmatic example.  The exception 
prohibits adverse employer action that contradicts public policy.  It mainly 
protects private employees who serve on juries, file claims about 
                                                                                                                          
97 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 13 (1883). 
98 The Court did extend some First Amendment protections to independent contractors.  See infra 
Part III.C. 
99 While the origins of the rule are contested, most courts usually cite Payne v. Western & Atlantic 
Railroad Co., 81 Tenn. 507, 518 (1884).  For various explanations, see generally Jay M. Feinman, The 
Development of the Employment At Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 118 (1976); Matthew W. Finkin, 
The Bureaucratization of Work: Employer Policies and Contract Law, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 733. 
100 It should be noted that a sizable minority of public sector employees are employed on an at-
will basis.  Estlund, supra note 56, at 130. 
101 See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15 (2006) (prohibiting forms 
of employment discrimination). 
102 See, e.g., Deborah A. Ballam, Employment-At-Will: The Impending Death of a Doctrine, 37 
AM. BUS. L.J. 653 (2000) (discussing statutes and common law exceptions that erode the employment 
at will rule); Gary E. Murg & Clifford Scharman, Employment At Will: Do the Exceptions Overwhelm 
the Rule?, 23 B.C. L. REV. 329 (1982) (discussing exceptions to the employment at will rule).  
103 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.01 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2009) 
(presenting the at-will rule as the default rule in employment relations). 
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workplace injuries, refuse to commit illegal acts, and report certain 
violations to public authorities.104  The exception protects speech, though 
mostly speech resembling whistle-blowing rather than dissenting speech 
more generally.  However, the exception has been stingily applied and 
circumscribed.105  In most courts, the exception applies only where the 
public policy is clearly expressed in a statute or a constitutional provision, 
and sometimes even that is insufficient.106  Some courts require that the 
policy be stated in the particular state’s law instead of a federal statute.107  
Courts have tended to apply the exception to health and safety issues, so 
speech critical of workplace issues unrelated to health and safety tends not 
to receive protection.108  For example, employees who reported potential 
embezzlement, theft, and false record keeping to their superiors have not 
received protection because the conduct complained of was confined to 
internal affairs, and thus did not affect public policy.109 
Private sector unionization alleviates some of these concerns. 
Collective bargaining agreements guarantee just cause proceedings, 
including a hearing before a neutral arbiter.  But these protections are 
underscored by the low number of unionized employees—currently around 
seven percent of the private workforce.110  Notably, private employees who 
benefit from just cause proceedings are not immune from speech-related 
retaliatory actions.  Collective bargaining agreements guarantee a fair 
procedure prior to termination, but they are likely to be unavailing when 
                                                                                                                          
104 Summers, supra note 15, at 70–71.  
105 See, e.g., Lauren Edelman et al., Professional Construction of Law: The Inflated Threat of 
Wrongful Discharge, 26 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 47, 47 (1992) (introducing their findings that the perceived 
threat from wrongful discharge suits is much greater than the chances they will succeed); Cynthia L. 
Estlund, Wrongful Discharge Protections in an At-Will World, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1655, 1657 (1996) 
(arguing that “the at-will presumption continues to operate within the realm of wrongful discharge 
protections . . . [and] continues to surround and undermine each of those protections”). 
106 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 4.02 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2009) 
(stating that an employer is subject to liability for disciplining an employee when the employee engages 
in activity that directly furthers a substantial public policy).  Although Novosel v. Nationwide Insurance 
Co., 721 F.2d 894, 900 (3d Cir. 1983), applied First Amendment norms to a private employment 
dispute, subsequent federal and state courts refused to follow its holding that constitutional norms 
govern a public policy exception without state action.  RICHARD A. BALES ET AL., UNDERSTANDING 
EMPLOYMENT LAW 89–90 (2007). 
107 Summers, supra note 15, at 73. 
108 See id. at 73–74 (describing cases). 
109 Id. at 74 & n.49; see also Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 380 (Cal. 1988) 
(finding that public policy did not prohibit an employer from discharging an employee who reported 
suspected embezzlement); Donahue v. Schwegman, Lundberg, Woessner & Kluth P.A., 586 N.W.2d 
811, 815 (Minn. App. 1998) (finding that the constructive discharge of an employee who reported 
potentially illegal payroll deductions was not prohibited because “[a] law firm’s payroll deduction 
practice did not raise public interest concerns”); Murphy v. Am. Home Prods. Corp. 448 N.E.2d 86, 
89–90 (N.Y. 1983) (declining, as a matter of public policy, to create a cause of action for wrongful 
discharge where an employee reported the suspected falsification of financial records). 
110 Union Members Summary, BUREAU LAB. STAT. (Jan. 23, 2013), http://www.bls.gov/news.rele
ase/union2.nr0.htm. 
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there is no underlying substantive speech right or when the public policy 
exception has been narrowly construed.  The same holds true for public 
sector employees who benefit from just cause proceedings that are likely to 
be unavailing when there is no underlying substantive right. 
Most speech-related protections, however, are found in federal and 
state whistleblower statutes.111  These protections improved the status of 
private employees, making them more like public employees.  However, 
federal protections for whistleblowers depend on the existence of a statute 
that addresses a particular problem.112  Problems of enforcement have 
plagued these provisions from being realized to their full extent.113  For 
federal employees, there is the Whistleblower Protection Act,114 whose 
enforcement has been partial and lacking.115  Other speech-related claims 
fare no better.  Bush v. Lucas116 held that federal employees cannot bring a 
Bivens suit117 for First Amendment violations since the federal statutory 
                                                                                                                          
111 See generally STEPHEN M. KOHN, CONCEPTS AND PROCEDURES IN WHISTLEBLOWER LAW 
(2001) (describing state and federal protections).  
112 See, e.g., Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2622(a) (2012) (protecting 
whistleblowers who participate in proceedings arising under the statute); National Labor Relations Act, 
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4) (2006) (same); Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) 
(2006) (same); Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 660(c) (2006) (same); Federal Surface 
Mining Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1293(a) (2006) (same); Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1367(a) 
(2006) (same); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7622(a) (2006) (same).  
113 See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-362, WHISTLEBLOWER 
PROTECTION: ACTIONS NEEDED TO IMPROVE DOD’S MILITARY WHISTLEBLOWER REPRISAL PROGRAM 
13–23 (2012) (discussing weakness in the whistle blower reprisal program); U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-722, WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION: SUSTAINED MANAGEMENT 
ATTENTION NEEDED TO ADDRESS LONG-STANDING PROGRAM WEAKNESSES 14–37 (2010) (discussing 
weaknesses that the office found in the whistleblower protection program); Estlund, supra note 105, at 
1673 (discussing other difficulties of enforcement); Richard Moberly, Protecting Whistleblowers by 
Contract, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 975, 982 (2008) (discussing the varied nuanced factors that contribute to 
the ineffectiveness of the various whistleblower protections); Richard E. Moberly, Unfulfilled 
Expectations: An Empirical Analysis of Why Sarbanes-Oxley Whistleblowers Rarely Win, 49 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 65, 129, 150–52 (2007) [hereinafter Unfulfilled Expectations] (arguing that 
administrative decision makers strictly construe, and in some cases, misapply Sarbanes-Oxley’s 
protections creating a significant disadvantage to employees). 
114 Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-12, 103 Stat. 16 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C. (2012)).  
115 See, e.g., Terry Morehead Dworkin, SOX and Whistleblowing, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1757, 1766 
(2007) (noting that since 1984 only one out of one-hundred-twenty whistleblower appeals to the 
Federal Circuit has been successful); Jamie Sasser, Silenced Citizens: The Post-Garcetti Landscape for 
Public Sector Employees Working in National Security, 41 U. RICH. L. REV. 759, 790 (2007) (“From 
1999 to 2005, only two out of thirty whistleblower claims prevailed before the Merit Systems 
Protection Board; from 1995 to 2005, only one out of ninety-six claims prevailed before the Federal 
Circuit.”). 
116 462 U.S. 367 (1983). 
117 See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 389 
(1971) (creating a federal damages remedy vindicating violations of constitutional rights by federal 
officials). 
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remedial scheme is comprehensive.118  However, an examination of this 
statutory remedial scheme, which also covers federal whistleblowers, 
reveals that no employee speech claim has succeeded in the Merit System 
Protection Board or the Federal Circuit—the bodies charged with 
addressing these claims.119 
At the state level, speech protections are found in whistleblower 
statutes, which vary widely according to the type of whistleblower 
protected, the appropriate recipient of the report, the subject of protected 
whistle-blowing, the motive of the whistleblower, the quality of the 
evidence offered by the whistleblower, and the remedies offered.120  It is 
important to note, however, that most states do not have comprehensive 
common law or statutory schemes to protect whistleblowers.  Sixteen states 
and the District of Columbia offer no protection at all, for either public or 
private employees.121 
To sum up, not only is there a lack of uniformity that results in 
uncertainty and inconsistencies across jurisdictions, but the speech-related 
protections are also narrowly construed—focusing mostly on speech 
related to gross misconduct, fraud, corruption, and illegality.  Such 
protections do not cover private sector analogues of Myers or Ceballos, and 
they rarely cover critical and dissenting speech that does not amount to 
straightforward whistle-blowing.  The private sector analog of Bryan 
Gonzalez would similarly not be protected under these statutory and 
common law arrangements. 
This doctrinal reality places public and private employees on very 
similar footing.  Indeed, as early as 1977, only nine years after the height 
of protection in Pickering, the Court suggested that “[t]he uniqueness of 
public employment is not in the employees nor in the work performed; the 
uniqueness is in the special character of the employer.”122  As will be 
discussed below, this statement is problematic,123 but given the decrease in 
speech rights in the public sector and the relative similarity to private 
employees, it is unclear that the Court even maintains the position that 
public employers are differently situated. 
                                                                                                                          
118 Bush, 462 U.S. at 371, 388–90; see also id. at 385 n.25 (providing examples of legislation 
including the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978). 
119 Paul M. Secunda, Whither the Pickering Rights of Federal Employees?, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 
1101, 1131, 1142 (2008). 
120 BARRY, supra note 64, at 57; Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, The State 
of State Whistleblower Protection, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 99, 107–08 (2000); see also Garcetti v. Ceballos, 
547 U.S. 410, 440 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting) (commenting on state whistleblower laws). 
121 State Whistleblower Laws, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/issues-
research/labor/state-whistleblower-laws.aspx (last visited Aug. 28, 2013). 
122 Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 230 (1977) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Clyde 
W. Summers, Public Sector Bargaining: Problems of Governmental Decisionmaking, 44 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 669, 670 (1975)). 
123 See infra Part IV. 
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Of course, public sector employment is not identical to private sector 
employment.  Yet when it comes to speech, the Court has embraced a logic 
and rhetoric that makes it hard to distinguish the two.  According to 
Garcetti, employees do not have speech rights in their job because the 
employer commissioned that speech.124  The government has bought the 
speech, and without the government there would be no speech in the first 
place.125  In other words, the government is claiming the speech of its 
employees as its own merely in virtue of the employment relationship.  
Although this is an iteration of the government speech doctrine, which 
holds that the government does not have to maintain viewpoint neutrality 
when it speaks to advance its views,126 it is also no different from the 
accepted proposition that the private employer owns the employee’s speech 
because she is paying her wages. 
Similarly, public employee speech cases emphasize the need for office 
efficiency, but the Court understands efficiency in terms imported from the 
private sector.  It equates efficiency with hierarchy and compliance with 
authority.127  To be efficient is to do what the employer has demanded or 
commissioned, with as much or as little discretion as the employer desires.  
The counterpart to efficiency is the Court’s elevation of non-disruption to a 
value worthy of judicial protection—just as in the private sector, a 
dissenting employee threatens office harmony and jeopardizes the 
employer’s ability to conduct business in the way she desires.  The 
trajectory of the public employee speech cases then mimics the conditions 
of private employment by giving public employers the same control held 
by private sector employers.  The government workplace is construed as a 
“business” that, while not motivated by profit concerns, has come to reflect 
some of the same modes of thought. 
As Professor Elizabeth Dale observed in her analysis of Garcetti, the 
Court has embraced the idea of “management rights,” a familiar concept in 
private employment, where managers have the right to define office 
                                                                                                                          
124 Garcetti, 547 U.S at 421–22. 
125 See id. (“Restricting speech that owes its existence to a public employee’s professional 
responsibilities . . . simply reflects the exercise of employer control over what the employer itself has 
commissioned or created . . . . When he went to work and performed the tasks he was paid to perform, 
Ceballos acted as a government employee.”). 
126 See, e.g., Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 559 (2005) (“[C]ompelled funding 
of government speech does not alone raise First Amendment concerns.”); Rosenberger v. Rector & 
Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995) (“[W]hen the government appropriates public funds 
to promote a particular policy of its own it is entitled to say what it wishes.”). 
127 See Massaro, supra note 44, at 51–52 (discussing how courts construe public employment in 
strictly Weberian terms); see also Robert G. Vaughn, Ethics in Government and the Vision of Public 
Service, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 417, 424 (1990) (“Hierarchical management authority within an 
agency became identified closely with the vision of public service.”). 
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missions and the means to accomplish these ends.128  By incorporating the 
management rights approach, Dale notes that public agencies can now 
silence employees, yet she takes comfort in the extensive body of law that 
constrains managers by invoking past practices in the workplace, 
unionization, collective bargaining, and legislation.129  But given the partial 
protection of legislation, the relatively small number of public employees 
who are unionized,130 and the procedural rather than substantive protection 
of collective bargaining agreements, there may be little room for comfort.  
After leveling down public employee voice to that of private sector 
employees, the constraining mechanisms on managerial discretion are 
partial, at best. 
The Court’s decisions since Pickering have bolstered the inherent 
advantage public employers enjoy when it comes to controlling speech, 
essentially equating them to private employers.  Public employees are 
increasingly punished for behavior on the grounds of efficiency, non-
disruption, and protection of the employer’s image—values that are readily 
invoked in the private sphere.  Like the lack of protection in the private 
sphere, the Court views public officials as cogs in the service of the 
government machinery rather than agents who might serve a constitutional 
function. 
None of this is to say that guarding from disruption and maintaining 
efficiency are not valuable goals in the public workplace.131  It doesn’t 
follow, however, that they should be similarly construed.  The Court 
understands efficiency as rule following and compliance with superiors’ 
orders, yet the Court also suggests that its decisions promote the efficient 
delivery of government services.  The problem is that the two are not 
necessarily the same because compliance with orders will not always result 
in the optimal delivery of government services.  A police officer who 
speaks about misconduct is in all likelihood contributing to the efficient 
delivery of government services, even if his behavior causes some 
disruption in the chain of command.  The same goes for the value of non-
disruption.  A government office can be underperforming or managed 
poorly, but still be running smoothly, albeit incompetently.  Speaking out 
against mismanagement or incompetence will inevitably cause disruption, 
                                                                                                                          
128 Elizabeth Dale, Employee Speech & Management Rights: A Counterintuitive Reading of 
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 175, 213 (2008). 
129 Id. at 214. 
130 Union membership among public sector employees stood at 35.9% in 2012.  Union Members 
Summary, supra note 110. 
131 The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 provides that an agency may take adverse action against 
an employee “only for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service.”  5 U.S.C. § 7513(a) 
(2012). 
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but such disruption would usually be valuable and welcome.132  The Court 
is thus conflating deference to authority with efficiency.  Not only does this 
equate efficiency with managerial discretion, it elevates a non-
constitutional value to a level worthy of constitutional protection without 
examining the costs of equating the government to a private actor. 
More importantly, although economic efficiency is undoubtedly crucial 
in a competitive market, it is less clear that it plays (or should play) a 
similar role in the governance of public institutions that do not operate in a 
for-profit competitive environment.  The notion that government must be 
efficient is, after all, in tension with two basic themes of constitutional 
governance: (1) that government should operate fairly and equitably and 
consider all relevant viewpoints prior to making a decision;133  and (2) that 
conflict results in more voice and more information, that extensive 
deliberation is a virtue, not a vice, and that the Constitution has 
purposefully put in place inefficient structures to realize these goals.134  
Sometimes it is a good idea to take time, encourage dissent, and take the 
long term view.135  This too, can be “efficient” in its own way, because 
efficiency is defined relative to the goal we are interested in accomplishing.  
The goal in the public sphere is not necessarily the private sector analog of 
production or profit maximization, but rather public welfare, justice, and 
fairness.136  If economic models of behavior determine the scope of First 
Amendment protection, then it is not surprising that distinctions such as 
private employment and public employment come to be viewed as 
anachronistic or artificial. 
Finally, the Court may be conceding too much to efficiency 
                                                                                                                          
132 This buttresses Professor Kozel’s argument that the disruption prong constitutionalizes a 
“heckler’s veto.”  See supra note 95 and accompanying text.  
133 For example, it may be economically “efficient” to decide on a zoning ordinance based on the 
opinion of experts, but public meetings and other deliberative and transparency-related processes that 
may be less “efficient” can be more legitimate. 
134 The classic reference is Federalist 51 in which James Madison argued that “[a]mbition must be 
made to counteract ambition.”  THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 264 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 
2009); see also Elena Kagan, supra note 17, at 2342 (discussing Federalist 51).  As Gary Wills notes, 
some argue that inefficiency is a safeguard against despotism.  GARY WILLS, A NECESSARY EVIL: A 
HISTORY OF AMERICAN DISTRUST OF GOVERNMENT 318–19 (1999). 
135 See Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous 
Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2344–45 (2006) (noting that efficiency is not the equivalent 
of wisdom, which requires “tradition-bound professionalism and the realization that future generations 
will feel the effects of earlier politicians’ decisions”). 
136 See Exec. Order No. 13,563, 3 C.F.R. 215, 215–16 (2011) (stating that cost and benefits are 
only one principle of regulation); JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES 
DO AND WHY THEY DO IT 317–18 (1989) (arguing that government efficiency needs to be tailored to 
the goal we are interested in meeting, such as accountability and fairness); cf. William E. Scheuerman, 
Democratic Experimentalism or Capitalist Synchronization? Critical Reflections on Directly-
Deliberative Polyarchy, 17 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 101, 126–27 (2004) (arguing that efficiency is 
primarily a demand imposed by markets, not democratic theory). 
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concerns.137  While efficiency is important, it is hardly the only value that 
guides government.  If efficiency was the paramount concern for 
government, we might dispense with warrants, transparency requirements, 
due process safeguards, affirmative action programs, and other constraints 
on government action that may impose inflated costs but enhance fairness, 
representation, and social welfare. 
B.  The Double Privatization of Public Service 
The leveling down of speech protections for public employees stems 
from an ideology where public employment is not very different from 
private sector employment.138  Yet the speech cases are part of an even 
larger trend that views public service itself as something that can be 
privatized.  This section highlights the ways in which this trend matches 
the ideology underlying the public employee speech cases.  The 
privatization of public service operates in two directions.  First, many 
activities that were once performed by the government are now outsourced 
to the private sphere.  This is a move from government outwards.  Second, 
civil service reforms increasingly incorporate private sector models of 
management, especially employment at will.  This is a move from the 
market into government, resulting in the marketization of the bureaucracy.  
Both these trends, I claim, permeate all levels of government, buttress the 
Court’s public employee speech doctrine, and contribute to a loss of 
valuable speech. 
1.  Privatization139 
Federal and state governments have increasingly privatized a 
significant portion of their work, ranging from the use of contractors for 
the war efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan and the development of weapons 
and technology, to disaster relief, education, the provision of welfare 
services, the management of prisons and border control, and the delivery of 
countless other services and key aspects of regulation and policymaking.140  
Although estimates are controversial, some estimate the number of private 
                                                                                                                          
137 This too may stem from the penetration of private sphere logic into the public sphere.  See 
JANICE GROSS STEIN, THE CULT OF EFFICIENCY 24–27 (2001) (examining the “marketization of our 
language in public life”). 
138 Paul Secunda argues that the convergence tendencies extend to the Fourth Amendment context 
as well.  Paul M. Secunda, Privatizing Workplace Privacy, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 277, 278–80 
(2012). 
139 I use the words privatization, outsourcing, and contracting interchangeably to describe the 
tendency of policymakers to rely on the private sector to perform tasks that were previously thought to 
be distinctly public.  See Jody Freeman & Martha Minow, Introduction: Reframing the Outsourcing 
Debates, in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 1 (Jody 
Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 2009) (using these terms in the same manner). 
140 Id. at 1–2, 13.  
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contractors at the federal level to be twelve times the number of 
government employees.141  The reasons for privatization are manifold, but 
can be broadly attributed to two factors.  The first is a culture of mistrust 
that is suspicious of any concentration of power for fear of abuse and 
corruption.  On this view, it is not public power that is troubling, but its 
centralization and aggrandizement, making popular control difficult.  
Privatization relieves some of these pressures by diffusing power to 
multiple actors, with the concomitant effect of government as a monitor of 
power rather than its locus.142  The second factor is couched in economic 
concerns that view privatization and deregulation as an engine of private 
sector innovation and improved performance, as well as a way to overcome 
bureaucratic ossification.143  From this perspective the decision whether to 
privatize turns on which sector does the job more efficiently rather than 
whether the function should be performed, in principle, by the state.  The 
focus on efficiency becomes a focus on cost minimization, while more 
idealistic notions of public service or non-instrumentalist constraints are 
jettisoned or deemphasized.144 
Encompassing vast areas of our life, privatization often masks the 
political choices it entails and the legal outcomes it generates.  Private 
employees doing governmental work are now directly responsible to their 
employers, and not to the people or the public interest.145  Correlatively, 
when government steps out of the picture it becomes less familiar with the 
situation on the ground.  When crucial elements of public policy are shared 
by non-governmental actors, each actor adds its own world of political 
economy that may produce programs that differ significantly from those 
that would result from direct government implementation.146  Finally, by 
removing state action and having the service performed by a private entity, 
its actions are largely immune from judicial review and public law norms 
such as Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests, due process 
safeguards, open meeting laws, enforcement proceedings, and notice and 
                                                                                                                          
141 Paul R. Verkuil, Outsourcing and the Duty to Govern, in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: 
OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, supra note 139, at 310, 311. 
142 William J. Novak, Public-Private Governance: A Historical Introduction, in GOVERNMENT BY 
CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, supra note 139, at 23, 32–33. 
143 Sharon Dolovich has named this “comparative efficiency.”  Sharon Dolovich, How 
Privatization Thinks, in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, 
supra note 139, at 128, 128 [hereinafter Dolovich, How Privatization Thinks]; Sharon Dolovich, State 
Punishment and Private Prisons, 55 DUKE L.J. 437, 441 (2005). 
144 Thus, privatization recasts the public/private distinction as a difference between organizational 
forms.  See Dolovich, How Privatization Thinks, supra note 143, at 145. 
145 See generally Martha Minow, Outsourcing Power: How Privatizing Military Efforts 
Challenges Accountability, Professionalism, and Democracy, 46 B.C. L. REV. 989 (2005) (describing 
how privatizing military activities can lead to a lack of transparency, accountability, and oversight). 
146 Lester M. Salamon, The New Governance and the Tools of Public Action: An Introduction, in 
THE TOOLS OF GOVERNMENT: A GUIDE TO THE NEW GOVERNANCE 1, 2 (Lester M. Salamon ed., 2002).  
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comment procedures.147  Even the decision to privatize is sometimes only 
known to public officials, preventing public participation.148  The decision 
to privatize public service is thus not only a political decision portrayed as 
an efficiency-based apolitical choice, but one that has legal implications for 
the purpose of accountability and oversight.149 
Privatization reflects and shapes the way we conceive of government, 
public employees, and public service.  Under privatization, the public 
sector is viewed primarily as a site of exchange where citizens seek to 
maximize the return on their investments; the logic of privatization is that it 
makes no difference who provides the service because government is 
already viewed as an agent of service rather than a site of deliberation, 
participation, and public regarding activity.150  True, the governmental 
decision-making process can be deliberative and participatory even if the 
execution of the decision is done by a private party.  Similarly, a private 
contractor may be required to act in a public-regarding manner.  Yet, one 
consequence of increased privatization is the transfer of discretion and 
policy-making power to the private sector, the blurring of the 
policymaking/implementation spheres, and the concomitant decline in the 
ability for effective monitoring.151 
Like the public employee speech cases, the economic logic of 
privatization has come to be reflected in constitutional law, with the state 
action doctrine being the paradigmatic example.  Initially, the Court was 
receptive to the application of constitutional law to private actors.  In 
                                                                                                                          
147 See Jon D. Michaels, Privatization’s Pretensions, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 717, 734–35, 745 (2010) 
(describing how private workarounds allow the executive to exercise greater discretion that is more 
difficult for legislatures or courts to review); see also David H. Rosenbloom & Suzanne J. Piotrowski, 
Outsourcing the Constitution and Administrative Law Norms, 35 AM. REV. PUB. ADMIN. 103, 104–05 
(2005) (describing how constitutional and administrative law restraints on government agencies are not 
applicable to private entities performing public work).  See generally Adam Shinar, Dissenting from 
Within: Why and How Public Officials Resist the Law, 40 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 601, 640 (2013) 
(describing how outsourcing governmental activities allows public officials to evade judicial scrutiny).  
Although private actors are occasionally treated as state actors, the Court has embraced a narrow view 
of when a private act constitutes state action.  See Daphne Barak-Erez, A State Action Doctrine for an 
Age of Privatization, 45 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1169, 1172 (1995) (stating the Supreme Court will treat 
private actions as state actions only in special circumstances). 
148 See Ellen Dannin, Red Tape or Accountability: Privatization, Public-ization and Public 
Values, 15 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 111, 136 (2005) (noting that the contracting and bidding 
process is usually kept secret). 
149 For attempts to apply administrative law norms to private actors engaged in the delivery of  
public services, see, e.g., Kimberly N. Brown, Government by Contract and the Structural 
Constitution, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 491, 529–34 (2011); Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public 
Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 574–92 (2000).  
150 Dolovich, How Privatization Thinks, supra note 143, at 143–45. 
151 See, e.g., Ellen Dannin, To Market, to Market: Legislating on Privatization and 
Subcontracting, 60 MD. L. REV. 249, 254 (2001) (arguing that most states lack regularized oversight of 
contracting). 
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Marsh v. Alabama,152 the Court created the “public function” doctrine, 
reversing a trespass conviction of a woman who distributed religious 
leaflets in a “company town,”  thus rendering actions by a privately owned 
town as state action.153  The same year that Pickering was decided, Marsh 
was expanded in Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan 
Valley Plaza, Inc.154 to cover picketing in privately held shopping 
centers.155  But similar to Pickering’s legacy, the Court soon narrowed the 
scope of the public function doctrine.156  Indeed, its curtailment happened 
around the same time that public employees began to see their speech 
rights dwindle.  Beginning in the 1970s, the Court first overruled Logan 
Valley Plaza by denying First Amendment application to shopping 
centers.157  It then held that the public function doctrine was limited to 
activities “traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state” or 
“traditionally associated with sovereignty.”158  This formulation served to 
remove state action status from, among others, employees who spoke in 
government financed schools, nursing homes, prisons, public utility 
companies, and government-endowed monopolies.159  Those who were 
affected by these decisions were thus unable to assert constitutional claims, 
leaving them vulnerable to vagaries of the market160 
2.  Civil Service Reforms 
Although the privatization debate has mostly focused on the functions 
transferred to the private sphere, privatization’s effects on public 
employees and public service are less explored.  As a result of 
privatization, the public workforce has become smaller.161  In an attempt to 
become more efficient, many public employees have lost civil service 
protections; many have been converted to employees at will.  Public sector 
unions, along with collective bargaining rights, are under attack.162  The 
status of public employment itself has, in some cases, been privatized.  
                                                                                                                          
152 326 U.S. 501 (1946). 
153 Id. at 507–10. 
154 391 U.S. 308 (1968). 
155 Id. at 309. 
156 Barak-Erez, supra note 147, at 1186. 
157 Hudgens v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 424 U.S. 507, 520 (1976). 
158 Flagg Bros. Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155 (1978); Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 
345, 353 (1974). 
159 See Barak-Erez, supra note 147, at 1177–80, 1185 (discussing cases in these settings where 
state action status was rejected). 
160 A plausible argument is that given increased privatization, some private sector employees who 
work in privatized services should also enjoy First Amendment rights.  While I do not develop the 
point further, it is consistent with my overarching argument. 
161 See Michaels, supra note 147, at 752 (discussing legislative caps restricting the number of 
employees government can hire). 
162 See Monica Davey & Steven Greenhouse, Big Budget Cuts Add Up to Rage in Wisconsin, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 17, 2011, at A1 (describing efforts to decrease union benefits in Wisconsin). 
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Below I briefly explore the changing world of public sector employment 
and then discuss its implications for public employee speech. 
Public sector employment has undergone three major phases.  In the 
first phase, the executive was in charge of appointing most bureaucrats, 
mostly through a system of spoils and political patronage, thus ensuring 
responsiveness to and conformity with political pressures.  The Pendleton 
Act, passed in 1883,163 sought to replace this system, which many viewed 
as corrupt,164 with a system based on merit and greater separation between 
politics and administration.165  The merit system, however, generated 
concerns of administrative inefficiency and ossification.166  Bureaucrats 
were seen as detached, resistant to political pressures, and largely 
following their own agenda, thus undermining democratic accountability.  
The idea that government was the problem, not the solution, marshaled 
most notably by President Reagan, impacted the structure of public service 
and correlated with the rise of the New Public Management movement, 
which advocated the importation of private sector management models into 
the public sector.167  This was reflected in the third phase of deregulation, 
privatization, and civil service reforms, where we find ourselves today.168 
Although the picture at the federal level has remained relatively 
constant in the past few decades, there has been greater transformation at 
the sub-national level, amounting to nothing short of an attack on civil 
service workers.169  Many states have started to experiment with converting 
their employees to at-will status, believing that this will guarantee greater 
responsiveness to managers—who will have an easier time dismissing 
nonperforming employees.  The move to an at-will model also affected 
                                                                                                                          
163 Pendleton Civil Service Reform Act, ch. 27, 22 Stat. 403 (1883). 
164 Jerry L. Mashaw, Federal Administration and Administrative Law in the Gilded Age, 119 
YALE L.J. 1362, 1391 (2010). 
165 Id. at 1390–91. 
166 For additional sources discussing the proposition of bureaucratic non-responsiveness to 
political will, see generally Richard C. Kearney & Chandan Sinha, Professionalism and Bureaucratic 
Responsiveness: Conflict or Compatibility?, 48 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 571 (1988); James P. Pfiffner, 
Political Appointees and Career Executives: The Democracy-Bureaucracy Nexus in the Third Century, 
47 PUB. ADMIN REV. 57 (1987). 
167 See Christopher Hood, A Public Management for All Seasons?, 69 PUB. ADMIN. 3, 3–4 (1991) 
(discussing “New Public Management,” which includes a reversal of government growth and a shift 
towards privatization). 
168 See generally Donald E. Klinger, Societal Values and Civil Service Systems in the United 
States, in CIVIL SERVICE REFORM IN THE STATES: PERSONNEL POLICY AND POLITICS AT THE 
SUBNATIONAL LEVEL 11 (J. Edward Kellough & Lloyd G. Nigro eds., 2006) (describing the changes in 
the civil service system in the past quarter century). 
169 See, e.g., James S. Bowman & Jonathan P. West, Removing Employee Protections: A ‘See No 
Evil’ Approach to Civil Service Reform, in ETHICS AND INTEGRITY OF GOVERNANCE: PERSPECTIVES 
ACROSS FRONTIERS 181, 184 (Leo W.J.C. Huberts et al. eds., 2008) (discussing civil service reform at 
the federal level); Jon D. Michaels, Privatization’s Progeny, 101 GEO. L.J. 1023, 1042–50 (discussing 
the marketization of bureaucracy). 
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other due process rights, grievance procedures, disciplinary appeals, and 
termination notices, some of which were scrapped. 
For example, the Texas civil service has been completely 
declassified.170  All public sector employees are now employees at will 
who have been stripped of due process protections and job security.  
Similar efforts are underway in about twenty-eight states that have 
experimented with at-will employment for some of its public sector 
employees.171  In Kansas, every top level job that becomes vacant is 
automatically converted to an at-will position.172  In South Carolina, the 
state personnel system was decentralized and eliminated career protections 
from hundreds of high-level employees, before abolishing its merit system 
altogether in favor of employment at will.173  In Arkansas, managers are 
given especially wide latitude over employment matters.174  In Alaska, 
reclassifying employees as at-will is subject to managerial discretion, even 
if union contracts stipulate the opposite.175  In Nebraska and Utah, 
“legitimate business needs” are grounds for dismissal.176  In West Virginia, 
the burden is on the employee when she grieves about reclassification or 
certain other adverse actions, and in Oklahoma, most of the employee 
grievance system was dismantled due to the “pressing need for business 
development.”177  Although in many states the number of public at-will 
employees is still relatively small, the number is quite large in some 
states.178 
Driving these trends in the public sector is the desire to increase 
executive control of bureaucracy, improve productivity and flexibility, and 
enhance performance.  Yet there is an uncritical acceptance that private 
sector arrangements (such as employment at will) will work just as well in 
the public sector,179 despite research showing that job security, not 
insecurity, is the best predictor of public sector performance because it 
strengthens employee commitment to the organization.180  Indeed, as states 
                                                                                                                          
170 Steven W. Hays & Jessica E. Sowa, A Broader Look at the “Accountability” Movement: Some 
Grim Realities in State Civil Service Systems, 26 REV. PUB. PERSONNEL ADMIN. 102, 108 (2006). 
171 Id. at 107–08. 
172 Id. at 109. 
173 Id. 
174 See id. at 111 (noting that Arkansas has given managers “absolute authority over all [human 
resource management] issues short of discrimination and retaliation”). 
175 Id. 
176 Id. 
177 Id. 
178 See id. at 113 (listing the percentage of at-will public employees as follows: Texas 100%; 
Georgia 72%; Idaho 48%; Kansas 40%; Colorado 35%; Oklahoma 33%; West Virginia 30%; and 
Illinois, Washington, and Ohio 20%). 
179 Jerrell D. Coggburn, At-Will Employment in Government: Insights from the State of Texas, 26 
REV. PUB. PERSONNEL ADMIN. 158, 159 (2006). 
180 Id. at 167–68.  Similarly, employees tend to value organizations that have due process 
protections.  See, e.g., Mark C. Suchman, Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional 
 
 34 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:1 
gain more experience operating under at-will arrangements, they become 
either less enthusiastic or more realistic about its promise of greater 
efficiency.181 
State civil service reform efforts are couched in a language of 
efficiency and strengthening managerial authority, the same terms used by 
the Court in Waters, Connick, and Garcetti to scale back speech 
protections.182  Indeed, the emphasis on managerial prerogative in the free 
speech cases runs parallel to the same impulse when reforming civil 
service systems: a preference for private sector models of productivity and 
management.  In the civil service context, this move is illustrated by the 
drive to privatization and outsourcing, accompanied by the erosion of 
traditional civil service protections.183  In the speech context, we see the 
move in references to management prerogatives, non-disruption, and client 
service.  Yet, it is the same line of thought producing and informing these 
outcomes. 
C.  Connecting the Dots:  The Triple Loss of Public Employee Speech 
Privatization and civil service reforms are viewed either through the 
lens of diminished accountability and oversight or through a 
labor/employment law focus on the erosion of civil service protections.  
How these structural changes affect the exercise of public employee speech 
is often overlooked.  First, privatization and outsourcing mean that there 
are fewer public employees.184  Thus there is simply less (quantitatively) 
speech available since potential speech goes “private” where it is 
controlled by the employer.  Second, privatization means severing the link 
between the state and the employee.  Private employees do what used to be 
government work, but unlike public employees, they will rarely possess 
                                                                                                                          
Approaches, 20 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 571, 580 (1995) (defining procedural legitimacy for an 
organization, and noting that organizations garner moral acceptance by employing socially accepted 
procedural safeguards); Tom R. Tyler, Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy and Legitimation, 57 
ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 375, 380, 383 (2006) (noting that employees’ views of the legitimacy of 
organizational rules affects their decisions to follow those rules).  
181 See Jerrell D. Coggburn et al., State Government Human Resource Professionals’ Commitment 
to Employment At Will, 40 AM. REV. PUB. ADMIN. 189, 201–02 (2010) (describing a study wherein 
human resource professionals who worked in the private sector tended to have less strong feelings 
about producing desirable results for the government); Stephen E. Condrey & R. Paul Battaglio, Jr., A 
Return to Spoils? Revisiting Radical Civil Service Reform in the United States, 67 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 
425, 427 (2007) (finding that there is no good evidence suggesting that civil service reforms improved 
service delivery). 
182 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 425–26 (2006); Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 674–75 
(1994); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 156–57 (1983). 
183 Condrey & Battaglio, supra note 181, at 425. 
184 This joins the current political antipathy toward public sector employees.  See Stephen F. 
Befort, Public-Sector Employment Under Siege, 87 IND. L.J. 231, 232 (2012) (recognizing that public 
employers have resorted to “layoffs, hiring freezes, wage freezes, and employee furloughs”). 
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constitutional speech rights.  Those rights, even though they have been 
restricted over the years, could have provided at least some (though 
minimal) protection had the services remained within the public sector.185 
Expanding the state action doctrine could have served a useful corrective, 
but the Court rejected that path.  Third, civil service reforms, the 
conversion to at-will status, and the erosion of traditional due process 
protections are in themselves a type of chilling effect.  By changing the 
employment paradigm, the remaining public employees are less free to 
speak about their agencies and are more likely to silence themselves on the 
fear that they will lose their job.  Thus, there is less protection for the 
speech that does remain “public.”  The effects of privatization and civil 
service reforms join the declining protection of public employee speech 
that was detailed in Part II, thus making for a triple loss of speech. 
By changing the workplace governance structure and relying on firms 
to deliver government services, the government has become dependent on 
the services of particular providers while encountering substantial 
difficulties in monitoring the various activities it outsources.186  Similarly, 
the public’s monitoring capacity also declines when its relationship to the 
public good becomes triangular instead of bilateral.  This should increase 
the value of public employee speech, for public employees sit at the 
triangular intersection as monitors of public markets and can thus mitigate 
the concomitant loss in monitoring ability.  But rather than counter the 
state’s privatizing tendencies, public employee speech doctrine reflects 
them. 
On its own, each trend—the de facto convergence of public and private 
employee speech, privatization, and state civil service reforms—raises 
challenges for governance and accountability.  Examined together, they 
interact to form a significant but overlooked transformation in the speech 
rights of public employees.  When government is run like a business, either 
by exporting services and functions to the private sector, or by importing 
private sector management models, it is not surprising that these logics 
permeate all levels of government, including the Supreme Court. 
Evidence of this can be found in a case where the Court addressed the 
relationship between government outsourcing and speech.  In Board of 
County Commissioners v. Umbehr,187 a waste removal contractor had his 
contract terminated after criticizing county officials.188  The Court held that 
                                                                                                                          
185 In research that focused on civil service reforms in Texas, twenty percent of personnel 
managers believe that at-will employment discourages employees from freely voicing objections to 
management directives and from blowing the whistle on illegal activities.  Coggburn, supra note 179, 
at 171. 
186 See, e.g., Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1369 
(2003) (bemoaning the inadequacy of the state action doctrine as a tool to constrain privatization). 
187 518 U.S. 668 (1996). 
188 Id. at 671. 
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the First Amendment may protect speech made by independent contractors, 
and that the Pickering test, adjusted to weigh the government’s interests as 
contractor rather than as employer, determines the extent of that 
protection.189 
While the decision may seem to be pro-speech since it expands the 
circle of who counts as a government employee for the purpose of the First 
Amendment, it ignores the reality of the workplace.  True, contractors now 
enjoy some speech rights when performing government contracts, but those 
rights do not extend to the contractors’ employees.190  Umbehr actually 
supports a restrictive view of the First Amendment.  In Umbehr it was the 
contractor himself who spoke.191  A private employee, working for a 
contractor who performs an outsourced job, is not likely to speak because 
(a) she wants to keep her job, and (b) her employer would like to retain the 
government contract.  Thus, the outsourcing adds another layer between 
the employee and the government.  If the Court wanted to equalize the 
rights of public employees and those performing government contracts, the 
correct reference point would have been individual employees and not the 
employer (contractor).  This is so because the idea (and value) of public 
employee speech is that it is the employee who will often be in the best 
position to detect and inform others of wrongdoing, illegality, waste, fraud, 
abuse, and other problems that the public or the employers need to know 
about.  Extending speech protections only to the contractor is tantamount to 
giving speech rights only to government agency heads who are often not 
interested in exposing intra-organizational problems.  Umbehr is therefore 
a further entrenchment of the managerial rights prerogative that is 
prevalent in the private sector. 
*** 
The public/private convergence in public employee speech has 
occurred in three sites:  
(1) The de facto equalization of public and private 
employees speech, placing both on relatively equal 
footing.  This convergence stems from a more general 
free market orientation that, in its extreme, does not 
distinguish the two types of employees. 
(2) Increased privatization, outsourcing, and government 
contracting.  These moves delegate important 
government functions to private actors who, for the 
                                                                                                                          
189 Id. at 678–79. 
190 That relationship is still governed by the rules of employment at will that present few obstacles 
to dismissal.  
191 Umbehr, 518 U.S. at 671. 
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most part, do not enjoy constitutional free speech 
protections. 
(3) State civil service reforms that import market models of 
personnel administration, most prominently at-will 
employment, and eliminate or erode traditional civil 
service protections, which make dissenting speech less 
likely. 
Examined together, these sites combine to produce a significant and 
overlooked loss in public employee speech. 
IV.  AGAINST CONVERGENCE:  AN ARGUMENT FOR INTERNAL CHECKS 
Identifying a convergence between the public and private sectors is not 
tantamount to its normative rejection.  Maybe government should be run 
like a business.192  Maybe public and private employees should enjoy a 
similar set of speech rights.  In this Part, I argue that the move toward 
public/private convergence should be reconsidered.  My argument unfolds 
in three moves.  First, taking private employment as a given baseline,193 I 
argue that public employment should not be similarly treated.  Second, I 
focus on public employee speech and elaborate on its unique contribution 
to democratic ends.  Third, I address possible objections to granting 
constitutional protection to public employee speech. 
A.  The Public Sector Is Not the Private Sector 
The easiest answer to why public employment is not like private 
employment is that the Constitution distinguishes these two spheres and 
imposes more obligations on government.  The Constitution generally 
applies to state action, not private action.  While this distinction may be 
conceptually incoherent, normatively undesirable, or difficult to apply with 
principle,194 it is nevertheless the one that is in place, and it rides on the 
intuition that there is something special about government.  The 
                                                                                                                          
192 See, e.g., Julia Beckett, The “Government Should Run like a Business” Mantra, 30 AM. REV. 
PUB. ADMIN. 185, 186 (2000) (describing the meaning of the mantra, “government should be run like a 
business”); Richard C. Box, Running Government Like a Business: Implications for Public 
Administration Theory and Practice, 29 AM. REV. PUB. ADMIN. 19, 20 (1999) (warning against viewing 
the government like a business); Robert B. Denhardt & Janet Vinzant Denhardt, The New Public 
Service: Serving Rather than Steering, 60 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 549, 550 (2000) (discussing the calls for a 
market conception of government). 
193 To be sure, current protections for private employee speech are suboptimal.  My objective is to 
prevent the slide that seeks to equalize the rights of public employees with those of private employees. 
194 See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 503, 503–04 (1985) 
(“There still are no clear principles for determining whether state action exists.”); Jody Freeman, The 
Contracting State, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 155, 176–89 (2000) (discussing the difficulty of applying this 
doctrine). 
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Constitution is concerned with the abuse of public power and its 
interference with individual action.195  The rule of law is concerned with 
constraining government action; the government is the organ that must 
justify its decisions to the citizenry. 
The textual explanation, however, although anchored in the 
Constitution and thus inescapable, possesses limited normative force.  
There are at least four additional substantive reasons for treating the public 
sector differently than the private sector.  Such reasons are found both in 
the special power that government exerts and its unique location vis-à-vis 
the market. 
First, private firms operate in a competitive environment geared toward 
profit.196  From the consumerist perspective, people believe they are getting 
the best deal possible because a truly competitive environment will 
maximize efficiencies that will reduce costs, thus giving the consumer a 
cheaper and better product.  Presumably, private firms can provide a better 
product because competition forces them to deploy a host of devices that 
mitigate agency costs and discipline managers.197  Consider, for example, 
that publicly held corporations face mandatory disclosure requirements, 
companies can be taken over, shareholders have exit rights, and consumers 
can switch products.198 
Government, however, does not operate in a similar profit-driven 
competitive environment.  The devices which mitigate agency costs in the 
private sector are largely absent from the public sector,199 making the 
importance of public employee speech greater.  In the public sector citizens 
will often face problems acquiring information;200 compensation is not 
linked to performance, which is difficult to measure.201  Moreover, there 
are no similar exit rights and no direct control over the vast majority of 
                                                                                                                          
195 See Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 588 (2000) 
(arguing that “[e]ven in an era marked by the rise of multinational corporations . . . the claim that public 
power is more menacing than private power remains unmovable as a pivot point in American public 
law”). 
196 Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES 
MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at 32, 32. 
197 Roosevelt, supra note 53, at 1245; Michael J. Trebilcock & Edward M. Iacobucci, 
Privatization and Accountability, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1422, 1425 (2003).  
198 Roosevelt, supra note 53, at 1246–47. 
199 See Trebilcock & Iacobucci, supra note 197, at 1439 (arguing that “agency costs often afflict 
governments more severely than private enterprise”). 
200 Jennifer Shkabatur, Transparency With(out) Accountability: Open Government in the United 
States, 31 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 79, 88 (2012). 
201 For criticism of pay-for-performance measures in the public sector, see generally Patricia W. 
Ingraham, Of Pigs in Pokes and Policy Diffusion: Another Look at Pay-for-Performance, 53 PUB. 
ADMIN. REV. 348 (1993).  See also James R. Thompson, The Federal Civil Service: The Demise of an 
Institution, 66 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 496, 498 (2006).  
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public officials.202 
Second, the government is often the sole source of a particular service.  
Even when it competes with the private sector, different norms apply to its 
actions.203  Most of the government’s “products,” such as a criminal and 
civil justice system, national defense, environmental protection, police, and 
welfare services, are public goods that are not widely available on the 
market, if at all.  When they are available, we become wary of non-
government provision: certain services or commodities are too important to 
be left to the market; market provision creates negative externalities; and 
market provision infringes on the core essence of the product, insofar as it 
debases it, corrupts it, or perverts its social meaning, or because 
government provision creates collective solidarity and stakeholders in ways 
that private provision seldom can.204  While efficiency is undoubtedly a 
factor in government provision, it is rarely the government’s exclusive 
objective.205  We are not usually troubled with private actors and firms 
maximizing their profits (to a degree), though we would be skeptical of 
public servants being conditioned to think of themselves as self-interested 
utility maximizers.206  Even if public officials were interested in the 
maximization of their immediate supervisor’s utility, we would still want 
them to have potentially diverging public-regarding interests.  This 
explains why the privatization of certain services is viewed with suspicion: 
Giving a job from government to the private sector means transferring a 
task from a world where efficiency is a value to be balanced against equity 
and fairness to a world where economic efficiency is the predominant and 
paramount consideration. 
Third, government can use power in a way the private sector cannot.  It 
is often the only source of legitimate violence,207 and its status as provider 
of public goods requires an element of coercion and authority that is not 
found in the market.  Moreover, government’s actions bind all of us.  Its 
power over the people under its jurisdiction is ubiquitous and 
                                                                                                                          
202 One could argue that elections are a way to exercise exit rights, but this argument fails.  See 
infra Part IV.C.  
203 See CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS: THE WORLD’S POLITICAL-ECONOMIC 
SYSTEMS 146 (1977) (noting that polyarchy places power into the hands of elected officials who pursue 
a kind of public interest while a market system gives power to businessmen who have no such 
responsibility).  
204 For a recent statement along similar lines, see generally MICHAEL J. SANDEL, WHAT MONEY 
CAN’T BUY: THE MORAL LIMITS OF MARKETS (2012). 
205 See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198 (1976) (rejecting administrative ease and 
convenience as sufficiently important reasons to justify gender-based classifications). 
206 Donald P. Moynihan, The Normative Model in Decline? Public Service Motivation in the Age 
of Governance, in MOTIVATION IN PUBLIC MANAGEMENT: THE CALL OF PUBLIC SERVICE 247, 252 
(James L. Perry & Annie Hondeghem eds., 2008).  
207 Max Weber, The Profession and Vocation of Politics, in POLITICAL WRITINGS 309, 310 (Peter 
Lassman & Ronald Speirs eds., 1994). 
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omnipresent.208  Crucially, we are the source of that power.  Its actions are, 
in an important sense, our own, done for and on our behalf.  When public 
officials exercise power, they exercise power that we have given them.209  
Unless we are shareholders in a private firm, we have a weaker claim to 
control the behavior of private employers.210  We are thus arguably 
complicit in state action, even if in an attenuated way, from which we are 
never free.  Moving to a different country (or state) is difficult, and will 
simply substitute one omnipresent ubiquitous political rule for another.  It 
is this power that gives rise to unique state obligations such as transparency 
and accountability.  These obligations apply in the private sector too, but 
they are a priori limited because of the prevailing background 
understanding that private firms are not like the government and are thus 
not subject to similar stringent demands.  Moreover, such obligations are 
almost always viewed as external constraints on firms, whereas they are 
intrinsic to government work.  This is why, for example, government 
bureaucracies are more “bureaucratic” than their private sector analogues.  
We the people insist that they be more constrained, that there be more red 
tape.211 
Finally, because of their dependence on elected officials for resources 
and funding, government institutions, unlike private firms, are more 
vulnerable to the risk of being used for improper political purposes.212  This 
dependence can include, for example, attempts to restrict speech as a 
means of consolidating political power over public institutions, even 
without a legitimate governmental objective.213  The unique control that 
elected politicians can exercise over governmental institutions (agendas, 
budget, and appointments) raises concerns that are less salient in the 
private sector.214 
The central task of government, then, is to promote “liberty, justice, 
fair and equal treatment, and the setting of worthy norms and goals for 
                                                                                                                          
208 Paul Secunda argues that public employers also exercise more power over their employees 
than private employees, justifying a higher level of privacy protection.  Secunda, supra note 138, at 
277–78. 
209 See Richard Michael Fischl, “Running the Government Like a Business”: Wisconsin and the 
Assault on Workplace Democracy, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 39, 64–65 (2011) (“The employer is the 
whole people, who speak by means of laws enacted by their representatives in Congress . . . . Upon 
employees in the Federal service rests the obligation to serve the whole people, whose interests and 
welfare require orderliness and continuity in the conduct of Government activities.” (quoting Letter 
from President Franklin D. Roosevelt to Luther C. Steward, President, Nat’l Fed’n of Fed. Emps. (Aug. 
16, 1937))). 
210 Kermit Roosevelt III, Not as Bad as You Think: Why Garcetti v. Ceballos Makes Sense, 14 U. 
PA. J. CONST. L. 631, 644–45 (2012). 
211 WILSON, supra note 136, at 133. 
212 Lee, supra note 57, at 1744. 
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social conduct,”215 and maintain accountability, transparency, and 
fairness—principles that hold less sway in the private context.216  
Government has to answer to multiple constituencies, whose interests 
overlap and conflict, as part of its role as the guardian of the public interest, 
while firms answer to fewer constituencies—shareholders, consumers, 
suppliers, boards, regulators, and sometimes employees—albeit in a 
focused way.217  The public sector is therefore not just another sector.  The 
“public” is precisely the locus that democratic societies have devised in 
order to facilitate communicative activities.218  Restricting speech in the 
public sector is therefore profoundly at odds with a basic understanding of 
democracy. 
B.  Public Employees and Private Employees Are Not Similarly Situated 
Even if all the devices to mitigate agency costs were available in the 
public sector, there are still good reasons why public employment should 
be conceptualized differently than private employment.  Turning the public 
workplace into a market means losing sight of the importance of public 
service and its unique norms and culture.  When public workers are 
incentivized to operate like market participants, the likelihood that they 
will espouse a public service ethic decreases,219 as does the likelihood that 
they will exercise speech rights in a way that benefits all of us.  This is 
partly because the public interest aspect of government work is often 
(though not always) not shared by the private sector.  Much of private 
employment works on an incentive-based pay for performance, which has 
the potential to crowd out intrinsic motivations—such as commitment to 
public service.220 
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217 John D. Donahue, The Transformation of Government Work: Causes, Consequences, and 
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Press 10th ed. 1999) (1991).  
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There are three reasons why systems that reward self interest crowd out 
intrinsic motivations.  First, when actors believe their work is valued by 
extrinsic rewards they view the “locus of control for their actions as being 
external, reducing their sense of self determination and motivation.”221  
Second, ethical behavior requires autonomy and discretion.  In extrinsic 
rewards systems, actors feel they lose discretion, causing them to lose their 
ability to consider how their decisions affect the public interest.222  Finally, 
actors are more likely to internalize the market model and behave in 
desirable ways when financial rewards are present; their behavior itself 
becomes a commodity responsive to extrinsic rewards.223  Thus, the risk is 
that public service motivation will decrease because of the type of people it 
will attract and because the private sector culture will minimize public 
interest incentives. 
To be sure, the private sector is not monolithic, and workers generally 
have a need for autonomy, self-mastery, and purpose.  Recognition by 
peers, professional prestige, meaningful work, and leadership opportunities 
also affect motivation.224  Yet it is the introduction of financial incentives 
into public employment in the form of pay-for-performance that risks 
crowding out other motivational mechanisms, with the attendant risk of 
money’s corrosive influence.225  Moving to a market model in public 
employment increases the moral hazard inherent in opportunistic behavior, 
which can manifest in goal displacement, neglecting unmeasured aspects of 
performance, ignoring due process, emphasizing the bottom line, 
marginalizing equity and fairness, and stressing short term gains while 
                                                                                                                          
motivation.  As applied to the regulatory incentives, crowding-out theory predicts that external 
incentives that utilize monetary rewards or punishments may undermine intrinsic motivations.”). 
221 Moynihan, supra note 206, at 251.   
222 Thompson, supra note 201, at 498 (discussing the “cascading mechanism” of human capital 
management within public agencies in which employees feel an ethical responsibility to align their 
goals and performance with “the public interest”). 
223 See Moynihan, supra note 206, at 225 (discussing identification of public workers as market 
actors).  See generally Donald P. Moynihan, A Workforce of Cynics?: The Effects of Contemporary 
Reforms on Public Service Motivation, 13 INT’L PUB. MGMT. J. 24 (2010) (discussing how the move to 
a market model increases the opportunities for moral hazard and the likelihood of crowding out 
intrinsic values essential for maintaining the ethos of public service). 
224 See DANIEL H. PINK, DRIVE: THE SURPRISING TRUTH ABOUT WHAT MOTIVATES US 80–81 
(2009) (noting that behavior that emphasizes the “three nutrients” of autonomy, mastery, and purpose is 
“devoted to becoming better and better at something that matters” while “connect[ing] that quest for 
excellence to a larger purpose” and has become “critical for professional, personal, and organizational 
success of any kind”). 
225 See Edward L. Deci et al., A Meta-Analytic Review of Experiments Examining the Effects of 
Extrinsic Rewards on Intrinsic Motivation, 125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 627, 632 (1999) (arguing that 
financial rewards have a negative effect on intrinsic motivation); see also James B. Rebitzer & Lowell 
J. Taylor, Extrinsic Rewards and Intrinsic Motives: Standard and Behavioral Approaches to Agency 
and Labor Markets, 77–78 (Inst. Study Labor, IZA Discussion Paper No. 5058, 2010), available at 
http://ftp.iza.org/dp5058.pdf (finding that extrinsic rewards have a corrosive effect in public-regarding 
organizations). 
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focusing on competition—all of which stand in opposition to the professed 
goals of public service and public employment.226  Unlike many private 
sector jobs (though by no means all), public agencies often have to perform 
complex tasks that cannot be adequately measured like those taken on by 
market actors.  “Many activities are in the public sector precisely because 
of measurement problems.”227  The cultivation of a public service ethic, 
then, is crucial for the performance of government work, and its emphasis 
distinguishes it from private sector employment. 
C.  Internal Checks, Access to Information, and Public Employee Speech 
Public employee speech is an internal check on government power.228  
Checks on government are usually conceptualized as external: one branch 
checks another, the media and the public check government, and other 
actors such as inspectors general check executive performance.  Public 
employee speech, however, is an internal check because it is done by 
employees who are otherwise subordinate to their supervisors.229  In 
addition, such speech has a temporal advantage over other conventional 
checking mechanisms because it is done in real time.  The problem with 
public employee speech, however, is that it can also frustrate legitimate 
policy implementation and democratic accountability.  As Professor 
Lawrence Rosenthal has argued, allowing employers to discipline their 
employees for speech that is part of their official duty is justified because it 
holds officials accountable for the conduct of their offices.230  If managers 
cannot discipline and remove officials who are unwilling or unable to 
execute their duties as those policymakers wish, then they “cannot be fairly 
held politically accountable for the performance of their offices, and they 
cannot obtain full and effective control over the performance of public 
                                                                                                                          
226 See Moynihan, supra note 206, at 257 (noting that within the market model, and specifically 
with regard to “incomplete contracts,” public servants are permitted to “engage in opportunistic 
behavior at the expense of the principal’s goals”); see also Dannin, supra note 148, at 127–28 (noting 
that the incentive within private-sector employment to behave opportunistically and “cut[] corners” 
when dealing with government employers is in fact one reason why public-sector employment must not 
move toward a market model). 
227 Henry Mintzberg, Managing Government, Governing Management, HARV. BUS. REV., May 
1996, at 75, 79. 
228 A different justification focuses on the employee’s liberty interests and the republican value of 
cultivating a civic-minded community.  Stanley Ingber, Rediscovering the Communal Worth of 
Individual Rights: The First Amendment in Institutional Contexts, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1, 29 (1990).  I, 
however, focus on listener-based arguments.  
229 For a discussion on the checking function of bureaucracy, see Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. 
Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2376 (2006). 
230 See Lawrence Rosenthal, The Emerging First Amendment Law of Managerial Prerogative, 77 
FORDHAM L. REV. 33, 46 (2008) (“[I]f the elected officeholder is to be politically accountable for the 
manner in which the office discharges its duties, the officeholder must have the prerogative to control 
the manner in which those duties are discharged, including speech-related duties.”). 
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offices even after enjoying electoral success.”231 
This line of argument suffers from two problems.  First, Rosenthal has 
in mind a vision of an executive office where control is exercised by the 
office’s head.  Government institutions do not operate in such a way.  
Inside government there are multiple veto points in the form of inspectors 
general and legal counsel, and outside government there are media outlets, 
NGOs, and other institutions that shape governmental policy by bringing 
their pressure to bear.  This organizational flattening makes identifying the 
locus of accountability difficult when things go wrong, irrespective of 
public employee speech.232 
Second, for government to be legitimate it has to pursue the goals that 
people want.  Yet there is little reason to assume that the people are good at 
monitoring government, that they know what they’re getting, or that the 
current level of oversight is optimal.  Rosenthal assumes that elections take 
care of that problem, since people will vote unresponsive officials out of 
office.233  But given how elections are run and the level of voter 
information, this argument is dubious.  Indeed, one could argue that public 
employee speech is desirable precisely because it complements the 
democratic process.  Whereas Rosenthal extols democratic accountability 
through elections, the problems with elections are that they often do not 
translate voter preferences into public policy.  Voter ignorance, 
information asymmetries, and agency problems between politicians and 
voters give rise to numerous problems, so much so that officials can act in 
ways that systemically diverge from voter preferences with little or no 
sanction.234  As public choice theory demonstrates, there are many reasons 
to be suspicious of results generated by the political process, including 
                                                                                                                          
231 Id. at 48; see also Cynthia Estlund, Free Speech Rights that Work at Work: From the First 
Amendment to Due Process, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1463, 1472 (2007) (“It is all well and good for voters to 
elect officials and express policy preferences, but those democratic processes do not amount to much 
unless those elected and appointed officials can implement those policies.  And most policies can only 
be implemented through the words and actions of public employees.”). 
232 See JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT: THE ACCOUNTABLE PRESIDENCY AFTER 
9/11, at 208 (2012) (discussing how recent changes in communication and collaboration technologies 
had a “flattening effect” on the executive branch which increased “connections” among actors, both 
within and without, and thus resulting in decreased precision as to who in particular should be held 
accountable for institutional incompetence or malfeasance).  
233 See Rosenthal, supra note 230, at 111 (“The last say on the exercise of managerial prerogative 
is had by the voters.”). 
234 Christopher R. Berry & Jacob E. Gersen, The Unbundled Executive, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1385, 
1391 (2008); see also Edward Rubin, The Myth of Non-Bureaucratic Accountability and the Anti-
Administrative Impulse, in PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY: DESIGN, DILEMMAS AND EXPERIENCES 52, 70 
(Michael W. Dowdle ed., 2006) (“Most voters . . . are not perfectly informed about the issues, and the 
evidence suggests that they often suffer from apocalyptic levels of ignorance.”); Eric A. Posner & 
Adrian Vermeule, The Credible Executive, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 865, 881 (2007) (arguing that elections 
will never create “perfect preference alignment” between the President and the public); Matthew C. 
Stephenson, Optimal Political Control of the Bureaucracy, 107 MICH. L. REV. 53, 55 (2008) (arguing 
that elected officials will almost always deviate from majoritarian preferences). 
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elections.235 
Because elections are rarely about one issue, voters must aggregate 
issues and thus cannot do a good job of punishing or rewarding an official 
for one thing.  This problem is exacerbated because much of government 
work is invisible to citizens,236 so even if citizens are useful overseers, 
employees still play a unique role.  At the same time, monitoring costs are 
simply too high for external oversight mechanisms to be completely 
effective.237  Congress and courts are increasingly unable to check 
executive behavior because they too suffer from information asymmetries, 
lack of expertise and political will, and collective action problems.238  Thus 
to expect voters and other government institutions to police government 
effectively is unrealistic, especially given the increased complexity of the 
administrative state.  Moreover, elections can only mitigate some agency 
costs because often the relational distance between an elected official and a 
bureaucrat will be tenuous.  Even if elections responded to accountability 
concerns, as Rosenthal suggests, they are often unavailing when it comes 
to the operation of administrative agencies, especially independent 
agencies that are entrusted with a wide range of public responsibilities or 
agencies that are largely independent of political controls.239 
Another comparison with the private sector is outputs and inputs.  The 
private sector is controlled by outputs.  A firm produces a product that it 
needs to sell in order to survive.  The market disciplines the firm by 
deciding whether it wants the product, i.e., the output, which is reflected in 
                                                                                                                          
235 Berry & Gersen, supra note 234, at 1391; see also Trebilcock & Iacobucci, supra note 197, at 
1440 (noting that, under a public choice theory framework, policy makers are less concerned with 
“some universally recognized set of public interest goals,” and more concerned with advancing their 
self-interests). 
236 See SISSELA BOK, SECRETS: ON THE ETHICS OF CONCEALMENT AND REVELATION 177 (1982) 
(“Every government has an interest in concealment . . . . Concealment insulates administrators from 
criticism and interference; it allows them to correct mistakes and to reverse direction without costly, 
often embarrassing explanations; and it permits them to cut corners with no questions being asked.”); 
see also Wendy Wagner et al., Rulemaking in the Shade: An Empirical Study of EPA’s Air Toxic 
Regulations, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 99, 112, 114 (2011) (describing the lack of public oversight in the rule 
pre-proposal and post-proposal stages as a result of various interest groups’ opportunities to engage 
agency staff “free of . . . transparency requirements” and negotiate in secret).  The public either does 
not know what the government does, lacks the tools to acquire information because it doesn’t know 
what to ask, or is not involved because of high participation costs.  
237 See Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police 
Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 165–166, 176 (1984) (arguing that congressional 
oversight is best described not as a centralized policing model, but as a “fire alarm” model that depends 
on “alerts” by constituents and groups). 
238 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 234, at 885–891; see Katyal, supra note 135, at 2320–21, 2348 
(identifying specific obstacles to checking executive power that Congress and the courts may face); see 
also Shirin Sinnar, Protecting Rights from Within? Inspectors General and National Security 
Oversight, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1027, 1028–29 (2013) (remarking that Congress often lacks the proper 
information and incentives to check the executive power on matters of national security). 
239 See, e.g., Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935) (limiting the President’s 
ability to remove quasi-legislative and quasi-adjudicative officials). 
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the company’s stock price.  In contrast, the public exercises control of 
government largely by deciding on the inputs (elections).  There is very 
little control over outputs, since the products of government are difficult to 
quantify and the responsibilities of officials are largely indeterminate.240  A 
common argument in democratic theory, popularized by Edmund Burke, is 
that officials should not be subservient to the public because “government 
and legislation are matters of reason and judgment, and . . . what sort of 
reason is that . . . where those who form the conclusion are perhaps three 
hundred miles distant from those who hear the arguments?”241  Burke was 
skeptical of democracy, but he was right to note the problem of limited 
public control over officials that results from the relational distance 
between voters and politicians. 
If officials make decisions that the public and monitoring branches 
have limited knowledge of and little control over, public employee speech 
is useful insofar as it counteracts the problems inherent in external 
oversight of the political and administrative process.  The institutional 
location of public employees mitigates problems of information 
asymmetries and expertise, partially resolving problems with public, 
legislative, and judicial monitoring.  Relatedly, many of the issues 
employees bring up are those that, for various reasons, do not receive voter 
attention.  Even if government is “transparent,” many of its actions cannot 
be made salient without public employee speech.  In the private sector, 
because money is at stake, there is a natural incentive to find out about 
corporations, and there are firms that specialize in acquiring and selling 
this data.242  Firms are thus disciplined by the market, whereas public 
actors are often not.  Put differently, the market for corporate control does 
not exist in the public sector.243 
Unfortunately, courts are not sensitive to this reality, as there are very 
few instances where they would be willing to overrule managerial 
discretion.  Because the natural inclination of managers is not to be 
monitored, and since superiors often overstate the potential for disruption 
given the risk to their authority, opting for managerial discretion in public 
employee speech results in a conflict of interests.  The private sector 
remedy is regulation and forced disclosure, but there is no public analogue 
because there are few things the government must disclose on its own 
                                                                                                                          
240 LINDBLOM, supra note 203, at 146–48.  Because of the problem of output quantification, the 
public sector emphasizes just procedures. 
241 Edmund Burke, Member of Parliament for the City of Bristol, Speech to the Electors of 
Bristol: Speech at the Conclusion of the Poll (Nov. 3, 1774), in THE POLITICAL TRACTS AND SPEECHES 
OF EDMUND BURKE, ESQ. 345, 353 (W. Whitestone et al. eds., 1777). 
242 See Emily Steel, Companies in Scramble for Consumer Data, FIN. TIMES (June 12, 2013), 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/f0b6edc0-d342-11e2-b3ff-00144feab7de.html#axzz2d7RGnfW6 (noting the 
number of companies now dedicated to amassing and selling corporate and consumer data). 
243 Trebilcock & Iacobucci, supra note 197, at 1427. 
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initiative.244  Giving managers complete discretion regarding which speech 
to censor means reducing the oversight that can be performed by public 
employees. 
Finally, many public employees—though not all—have access to 
information that neither the public nor their supervisors possess.  Thus, 
they are uniquely positioned to know what ails their agency.  Because of 
the hierarchical structure of public organizations, managers have relatively 
little control over workers,245 resulting in frontline employees having 
discretion and autonomy.246  For example, individual police officers still 
make basic decisions regarding whom to stop without supervision and 
welfare workers decide which infractions to report and which to overlook.  
Most fundamentally, the limited resources mean that public employees are 
the ones who prioritize between citizens and ultimately decide who gets 
what.247  Their practices are the policies that are delivered.248 
As an illustration of the above argument, consider Houchins v. KQED, 
Inc.249  Following a prisoner suicide at a county jail where the conditions 
were said to be exceedingly harsh, members of the media wanted to enter 
the premises and take pictures.250  Rejecting their requests, the Court held 
that “[n]either the First Amendment nor the Fourteenth Amendment 
mandates a right of access to government information or sources of 
information within the government’s control.”251  However, the Court 
added that although access to government information is to be determined 
by the political process, journalists are able to speak to prison officials.252 
Houchins was decided in 1978, when public employees enjoyed more 
robust speech rights and when fewer prisons were privatized.253  The 
Houchins Court was correct in assuming that reporters could speak to 
                                                                                                                          
244 See Shkabatur, supra note 200, at 14 (“[FOIA] is fully ‘requester driven’—agencies are not 
obliged to generate information or proactively disseminate it.”); Roosevelt, supra note 53, at 1249 
(contrasting the disclosure requirements for corporations from the “great latitude” afforded public 
employers). 
245 See William H. Simon, Legality, Bureaucracy, and Class in the Welfare System, 92 YALE L.J. 
1198, 1226–33 (1983) (describing a variety of problems with a hierarchical “Weberian” model, 
including issues of communication and supervision). 
246 See, e.g., MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY: DILEMMAS OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN 
PUBLIC SERVICES 13 (1980) (noting the significant discretion exercised by street-level bureaucrats); 
JEFFREY MANDITCH PROTTAS, PEOPLE-PROCESSING: THE STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRAT IN PUBLIC 
SERVICE BUREAUCRACIES 113 (1979) (discussing the value of autonomy and resource preservation).  
247 MICHAEL K. BROWN, WORKING THE STREET: POLICE DISCRETION AND THE DILEMMAS OF 
REFORM 303 (1981); Steven Maynard-Moody & Shannon Portillo, Street-Level Bureaucracy Theory, in 
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY 252, 258–60 (Robert F. Durant ed., 2010).  
248 LIPSKY, supra note 246, at 84. 
249 438 U.S. 1 (1978) (plurality opinion). 
250 Id. at 3. 
251 Id. at 15. 
252 Id. at 12, 15. 
253 See id. at 3 (noting that the petitioner was a public county jail). 
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jailers.  Today, however, prison employees who speak about prisoner 
abuse, either to their supervisors or the media, risk discipline or 
termination.  Houchins assumed that journalists could rely on public 
employees to expose prison wrongdoing, yet the subsequent curtailment of 
public employee speech undermines that assumption, while shedding light 
on the critical role this speech could serve.  With media out of the prisons 
an important element of accountability is lost.  With the decline in public 
employee speech rights there is one less countervailing lever to check 
official discretion from within. 
D.  Anticipating Objections to Protecting Public Employee Speech 
Thus far I advanced a three-stage argument for protecting public 
employee speech.  Before elaborating upon my normative proposals in Part 
V, I anticipate and reply to objections that question the utility of 
constitutionally protecting public employee speech. 
1.    Public Employee Speech Is Not Sufficiently Valuable to Warrant 
Constitutional Protection 
Public employees have a unique institutional location and therefore 
possess information that is unlikely to be available from other sources.  
This is doubly important because people increasingly rely on government 
for information, which often comes with greater dependence.  When 
government’s role in people’s lives becomes more central, people are less 
inclined to find out additional and contrary perspectives.  New research 
demonstrates that lack of knowledge about sociopolitical issues does not 
motivate an increased search for information.  Instead, it leads to 
dependence on government, fostering system justification tendencies.  This 
tendency decreases people’s capacity to monitor their government 
effectively.  Public employee speech by people who are knowledgeable 
about government work can serve as a corrective, even if a minor one, to 
government speech.254 
Recently, Professor Kermit Roosevelt suggested that the “First 
Amendment is not intended to increase government efficiency.  It is 
intended to facilitate public oversight of government, and that purpose is 
not served by intra-governmental speech.  The line between talking frankly 
to superiors and voicing concerns publicly marks a real distinction from the 
First Amendment perspective.”255  In other words, Professor Roosevelt 
                                                                                                                          
254 Concerns with the powerful role of government expression are a mainstay of government 
speech scholarship.  See MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLITICS, LAW, AND 
GOVERNMENT EXPRESSION IN AMERICA 92–93 (1983) (critiquing governmental “referee[ing]” and 
over-participation in communication); Steven Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27 UCLA L. REV. 565, 
570–71 (1980) (describing the questions raised in contemplating government-based expression).  
255 Roosevelt, supra note 210, at 654. 
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argues that public employee speech is not valuable from the perspective of 
the First Amendment. 
This argument, I think, embodies a crabbed vision of the First 
Amendment.  There are good doctrinal and normative reasons to reject it.  
Doctrinally, the Court has protected public employee speech even when it 
was made privately to superiors without any public knowledge.  In Givhan 
v. Western Line Consolidated School District,256 the Court protected a 
teacher whose contract was not renewed after she expressed concerns to 
the principal about racially discriminatory policies.257  The Court stated 
that “[n]either the [First] Amendment itself nor our decisions indicate that 
this freedom is lost to the public employee who arranges to communicate 
privately with his employer rather than to spread his views before the 
public.”258  Although Givhan is difficult to reconcile with Garcetti, it was 
not explicitly overruled.259  Normatively, why should we adopt the position 
that oversight of government can only be achieved by the public?  The 
point of public employee speech is to provide a check on government from 
within.  Given the invisibility of much governmental work, there is a broad 
public interest in having public employees voice workplace issues, whether 
or not that voice makes its way out, because such speech can foster a more 
accountable government.260  And that is an end the First Amendment is 
designed to advance. 
Finally, a possible argument is that public sector unions, not individual 
employees, are the best vehicles for raising employee concerns.  This is a 
weak argument.  Only thirty-six percent of the public workforce is 
unionized.261  At the very least, there should be speech rights for the 
remaining sixty-four percent.  More importantly, the argument conflates 
union voice with employee voice.  Unions have their own interests to 
promote.  Their speech is valuable, but it should not be assumed that it 
subsumes employee speech.  At the federal level, for example, union 
speech is protected under the Federal Labor Relations Act and covers the 
right to “form, join, or assist any labor organization” and the right to 
“engage in collective bargaining with respect to conditions of employment 
                                                                                                                          
256 439 U.S. 410 (1979).  
257 Id. at 415–16. 
258 Id. 
259 The difficulty stems from the fact that the teacher might have been speaking pursuant to 
official duties and was not speaking “as a citizen.”  Compare id. (noting that the First Amendment 
protects confidential communications), with Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 426 (2005) (holding 
the opposite). 
260 Trebilcock & Iacobucci, supra note 197, at 1450. 
261 Dave Jamieson, Union Membership Rate for U.S. Workers Tumbles to New Low, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Jan. 23, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/23/union-membership-
rate_n_2535063.html?view=print&comm_ref=false. 
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through representatives chosen by employees.”262  This includes protection 
for speech related to joining or assisting a union.263  The interests protected 
are organizational in nature and do not address the matters covered by the 
public employee speech cases.  Because societal, employee, and union 
interests often diverge, we should not assume that union speech subsumes 
employee speech. 
There are clearly downsides to employee speech.  Employees can 
magnify little problems, be wrong about the problems they report, and 
disrupt the workplace.264  The potential for disruption will be addressed 
below.  As for the downsides to speech, given that some employee speech 
is undoubtedly valuable, the question cannot be whether it should be 
protected, but how much should be protected.  This will be addressed in 
Part V. 
2.  Public Employee Speech Is Disruptive and Generates Inefficiencies 
A central argument against robust protection of employee speech is 
that it can cause disruption and inefficiencies, making policy 
implementation difficult.  This argument is often made in a casual way that 
obscures its complexity.  There are at least two problems with the 
argument: doctrinal and conceptual. 
Doctrinally, although the Court insists it is protecting against 
disruption, in reality it protects the employer’s predictions of likely 
disruption.  Curiously in all the public employee speech cases where the 
Court upheld the employer’s action, there was no actual disruption.265  
Thus, the fear of potential disruption is so great that the Court does not 
even wait for it to happen before upholding the disciplining of employees.  
So even if anti-disruption is a worthy goal, the Court’s deference to 
employers errs by excessively protecting expectations without requiring 
any proof of actual disruption.266  Ironically, the Court may be contributing 
                                                                                                                          
262 5 U.S.C. § 7102 (2012).  State and local employees are governed by labor relations laws that 
vary from state to state. 
263 See, e.g., Old Dominion Branch No. 496, Nat’l Ass’n Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 
283 (1974) (protecting speech that labeled the plaintiffs as “scabs” because they did not join a union).  
264 It should be noted that in a survey of federal employees, seventy-four percent explained that 
before reporting they wanted to ensure that they had the facts and the evidence to back them up.  See 
U.S. MERIT SYS. PROT. BD., BLOWING THE WHISTLE: BARRIERS TO FEDERAL EMPLOYEES MAKING 
DISCLOSURES 17 fig.3 (2011), available at http://www.mspb.gov/netsearch/viewdocs.aspx?docnumber
=662503&version=664475&application=ACROBAT (suggesting a high level of concern among 
whistleblowers that they needed to have enough factual evidence).  
265 See Christie S. Totten, Note, Quieting Disruption: The Mistake of Curtailing Public 
Employees’ Free Speech Under Garcetti v. Ceballos, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 233, 237–45 (2008) 
(discussing a variety of pre-Garcetti cases and noting a repeated lack of disruption found by courts). 
266 But see THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 574 (1970) (“There 
must be specific proof that the expression has demonstrated incompetence to perform the job, violation 
of legitimate orders, or creation of serious organizational disruption.”). 
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to workplace disruption.  Recall that Garcetti is more protective of 
employees when they speak “as citizens,” that is, when they go to the 
public with their concerns.267  Going outside and behind supervisors, 
however, tends to create more disruption for the organization that now has 
to defend its policies publicly.268 
When courts protect against disruption they are acting to enforce a 
particular view—the employer’s.  Yet employers often overestimate the 
threat caused by dissenting speech.  Employers are concerned with 
preserving their authority, making them more likely to view dissenting 
speech as undermining that authority, even when the potential for 
disruption is low.  For example, researchers have found that managers and 
superiors are less open to criticism and that an elevated sense of power 
decreases their ability to monitor and censor themselves.269  Not only are 
supervisors prone to the same types of cognitive biases that make it 
difficult for individuals to hear challenges to their opinions, they are more 
susceptible to these biases precisely because they are leaders (because of 
the position they hold or in virtue of the qualities that made them 
leaders).270  Whereas the Court’s deference to the government is justified in 
grounds of operational efficiency, it may give rise to personnel decisions 
that are rooted in bias. 
The conceptual problem goes deeper, for it challenges the position that 
disruption is inherently problematic.  Disruption may be harmful to the 
operation of government, but it can also trigger positive change.  
Disrupting a poorly run organization is valuable.  Informing superiors 
about a harmful policy can improve the organization.  Speaking to the 
public about mismanagement, waste, or abuse is desirable even if it causes 
disruption.  Excessively guarding against disruption means promoting 
caution, stifling initiative, and risk taking.  The disruption rationale should 
be thus viewed with skepticism especially when speech is expressed in a 
hierarchical setting.  Suppressing such speech means that First Amendment 
values have little valence in the institutions that matter most: those that 
dominate our everyday life.  Protecting against disruption, therefore, is too 
abstract a goal.  On its own it is not sufficient to deny First Amendment 
protection.   
                                                                                                                          
267 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2005) (emphasis added). 
268 Similarly, external whistleblowing is more likely to suffer retaliation than internal reporting.  
Janet P. Near & Marcia P. Miceli, Whistle-Blowing: Myth and Reality, 22 J. MGMT. 507, 509 (1996). 
269 Elizabeth Wolfe Morrison & Naomi B. Rothman, Silence and the Dynamics of Power, in 
VOICE AND SILENCE IN ORGANIZATIONS 111, 113 (Jerald Greenberg & Marissa S. Edwards eds., 
2009). 
270 Susan J. Ashford et al., Speaking Up and Speaking Out: The Leadership Dynamics of Voice in 
Organizations, in VOICE AND SILENCE IN ORGANIZATIONS supra note 269, at 175, 188. 
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3.  There Is Enough Information About Government 
According to this argument, employee speech overlaps with similar 
information that exists or can be obtained through other means.  
Notwithstanding that public employees have unique information that is 
unlikely to be available from other sources, the argument ignores the 
silencing mechanisms that operate in the workplace.  The social dynamics 
that are prevalent in any organization, especially a hierarchical one, tend to 
suppress much employee voice.  Sometimes this is the result of explicit 
preferences of superiors.  More often it is the result of self-imposed 
censorship due to the difficulty of expressing opinions in hierarchical 
settings.  By encouraging public employees to speak out, or at the very 
least not penalizing them when they do, we will be taking a step toward 
overcoming these tendencies and bringing forward unique information. 
The Court rightly conceptualizes the government workplace in 
hierarchical terms, but it fails to acknowledge the pathologies these 
hierarchies generate.  When people interact they have a pervasive desire to 
have the good opinions of others.  The natural inclination is conformity, 
not dissent.  As Cass Sunstein notes, this can lead people to fail to disclose 
“what they know and believe.”271  If this is true for general society, these 
tendencies are stronger in the public workplace where the same people 
interact over a long period of time and institutions are less open to 
challenges.272  Potential dissenters often have little reason to speak out 
because they fear retaliation by their superiors or colleagues, either in the 
form of formal sanctions or other social sanctions, such as isolation or 
exclusion from important functions.273  Indeed, the “unpleasantness of 
standing alone makes the majority opinion more appealing than one’s own 
beliefs.”274  The pressure to conform often leads to anticipatory 
compliance—employees conform to the behavior that is expected of them 
without overt pressures.  This may result in excessive concurrence seeking, 
one of the hallmarks of groupthink.275  Speaking up is also difficult when 
the group has already converged on a position, since it is more likely to 
                                                                                                                          
271 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT 9 (2003).  For an early example of a study 
regarding conformity, see Solomon E. Asch, Studies of Independence and Conformity: I. A Minority of 
One Against a Unanimous Majority, 70 PSYCHOL. MONOGRAPHS: GEN. & APPLIED 1 (1956).  
272 Marcia P. Miceli & Janet P. Near, The Incidence of Wrongdoing, Whistle-Blowing, and 
Retaliation: Results of a Naturally Occurring Field Experiment, 2 EMP. RESPS. & RTS. J. 91, 94 (1989). 
273 See ELISABETH NOELLE-NEUMANN, THE SPIRAL OF SILENCE: PUBLIC OPINION—OUR SOCIAL 
SKIN 203–04 (2d ed. 1993) (recounting experiments that explored human subjects’ responses to threats 
of isolation). 
274 Gregory S. Berns et al., Neurobiological Correlates of Social Conformity and Independence 
During Mental Rotation, 58 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 245, 245 (2005). 
275 PAUL ‘T HART, GROUPTHINK IN GOVERNMENT: A STUDY OF SMALL GROUPS AND POLICY 
FAILURE 6 (1990).  For one of the seminal works regarding groupthink, see generally IRVING L. JANIS, 
GROUPTHINK: PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF POLICY DECISIONS AND FIASCOES (2d ed. 1982).  
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reject deviates.  This is known as “uniformity pressures,” where the group 
focuses on information all members share and tends to exclude unique 
information possessed by some of the members.276  This tendency is 
stronger in hierarchical organizations that have a centralized decision-
making process.277 
Of course, not every government organization suffers from these 
problems.  But the phenomenon of organizational silence exists in most 
large organizations.  As Professors Elizabeth Wolfe Morrison and Naomi 
Rothman found, silence results from power imbalances between managers 
and subordinates, who deem voice to be futile or risky.278  Leaders are 
consequently deprived of necessary information and organizational 
performance can be undermined.279  As Leon Festinger demonstrated, 
introducing a hierarchical structure impedes bottom-up communication280 
because relationships of power mean an asymmetrical control of resources, 
opportunities, and outcomes.  Subordinates are dependent upon leaders for 
their job, security, and material conditions.281  This produces conflict 
avoiding behavior so as not to jeopardize the relationship, resulting in 
supervisors not being aware of problems that need addressing.282 
Exercising pro-social voice depends on the speaker’s ability to 
anticipate the outcome of the speech.283  If employees see that people are 
dismissed, relocated, demoted, or harmed as a result of their speech, this 
will produce an environment where they are less likely to speak up and 
dissent in the future.  If voice has high initiation costs, it will be less heard.  
Thus the view that there is already a lot of information about the 
government is mistaken.  It fails to consider the potential speech that is 
                                                                                                                          
276 See ARIE W. KRUGLANSKI, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CLOSED MINDEDNESS 117–22 (2004) 
(discussing the rejection of opinion deviates and a study group’s focus on shared information). 
277 See id. at 124 (“Uniformity may [be] obtain[ed] more readily where one (or only a few) 
opinion(s) govern the discussion . . . .”). 
278 Morrison & Rothman, supra note 269, at 113. 
279 Id. 
280 Leon Festinger, Informal Social Communication, 57 PSYCHOL. REV. 271, 280 (1950). 
281 James R. Detert & Linda K. Treviño, Speaking Up to Higher-Ups: How Supervisors and Skip-
Level Leaders Influence Employee Voice, 21 ORG. SCI. 249, 250 (2010).  For an early statement, see 
ROBERT MICHELS, POLITICAL PARTIES: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF THE OLIGARCHICAL TENDENCIES 
OF MODERN DEMOCRACY 189 (1915). 
282 Frances J. Milliken et al., An Exploratory Study of Employee Silence: Issues That Employees 
Don’t Communicate Upward and Why, 40 J. MGMT. STUD. 1453, 1454 (2003); see Sidney Rosen & 
Abraham Tesser, On Reluctance to Communicate Undesirable Information: The MUM Effect, 33 
SOCIOMETRY 253, 261 (1970) (remarking that individuals are less likely to communicate negative 
information or information that would have negative consequences for the communicator). 
283 Marissa S. Edwards, Neal M. Ashkanasy & John Gardner, Deciding to Speak Up or to Remain 
Silent Following Observed Wrongdoing: The Role of Discrete Emotions and Climate of Silence, in 
VOICE AND SILENCE IN ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 269, at 83, 89; see also Brian S. Klaas, Julie B. 
Olson-Buchanan & Anna-Katherine Ward, The Determinants of Alternative Forms of Workplace 
Voice: An Integrative Perspective, 38 J. MGMT. 314, 319 (2012) (noting that an anticipated positive 
outcome for the whistleblower increases likelihood of whistle-blowing). 
 54 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:1 
suppressed as a result of the workplace environment.  Constitutionally 
protecting employee speech is a possible way to ameliorate this deficiency 
or at the very least protect those who manage to overcome these 
psychological tendencies.  If employees know they are protected, they will 
be more likely to exercise dissenting and critical speech. 
4.   Whistleblower Statutes Make Constitutional Protection 
Unnecessary 
A common refrain is that constitutional protection for public employee 
speech is redundant.  Since federal and state governments protect 
whistleblowers who report on government misconduct, constitutional 
protection would replicate extant statutes.284  This argument rests on a 
mistaken perception of the protection these statutes afford and 
misunderstands the nature of constitutional protection for speech. 
Whistleblower statutes, as explained above, are not uniform.  Sixteen 
states and the District of Columbia do not even grant statutory protection to 
public sector whistleblowers.285  Some of the states that grant protection to 
state employees deny similar protections to employees of local 
governments and other subdivisions.286  Many of the statutes impose 
demands that may hinder speech.  For example, some statutes require the 
employee to warn her superior, whereas others prohibit supervisors from 
requiring warning.287  Yet the decision how to speak has little to do with 
the value of the speech.  Because the decision how to speak is contextual, 
statutes that impose only one avenue can create a chilling effect.  I develop 
this point more fully below.288 
At the federal level, experience with the Whistleblower Protection Act 
has not been encouraging.289  One reason for this lack of success is a high 
burden of proof imposed by the Federal Circuit, the appellate court that 
hears federal employee claims,290 and excessive deference to decisions 
made by “hearing examiners” employed by the Merit Systems Protection 
                                                                                                                          
284 This was the Court’s opinion in Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 425 (2006). 
285 State Whistleblower Laws, supra note 121. 
286 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 440 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
287 Id.; see also Ruben J. Garcia, Against Legislation: Garcetti v. Ceballos and the Paradox of 
Statutory Protection for Public Employees, 7 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 22, 34 (2008) (noting flaws in 
alternative statutes under which the Ceballos case could have been brought). 
288 See infra Part V.A. 
289 See Sasser, supra note 115, at 790 (noting that only 3 out of a 126 claims raised under the 
WPA have been successful).  Importantly, national security whistleblowers are excluded from the 
coverage of the Act and from the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement.  See id. (noting that national 
security employees may lose their security clearance as a consequence of speaking out).  
290 See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 441 (Souter, J., dissenting) (explaining that the availability of 
statutory protection depends on the interpretations by federal courts).  
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Board who do not enjoy judicial independence like Article III judges.291  
Further, the Federal Circuit has held that statements made in connection 
with normal employment duties will not receive protection.292  As Justice 
Souter pointed out in his Garcetti dissent, this is exactly the speech that the 
Court has excluded from protection on the theory that whistleblower 
statutes will provide protection.  In a partial response to the Federal Circuit 
and Garcetti, Congress enacted the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement 
Act of 2012, which protects statements made in the normal course of 
duties.  The Act, however, covers only federal employees, and excludes 
important agencies from its coverage, such as employees in sensitive 
agencies including the CIA, FBI, and NSA, to name a few.293  Thus its 
scope is quite limited. 
The redundancy argument also fails because the First Amendment does 
not necessarily overlap with statutory and common law protections.294  
Whistleblowing is a particular type of speech reporting on illegality, fraud, 
waste, or abuse.  Constitutional protection for speech purports to cover a 
much larger swath of expressive activity.  For example, dissenting and 
critical speech like the one made by Bryan Gonzalez would not be covered 
by any state or federal statute.  The teacher in Givhan who spoke in private 
about racial discrimination would not have received statutory protection.295  
Right now, only the Constitution can potentially protect such dissenting 
                                                                                                                          
291 See Robert J. McCarthy, Blowing in the Wind: Answers for Federal Whistleblowers, 3 WM. & 
MARY POL’Y REV. 184, 205–10 (2012) (arguing that the Office of Special Counsel and the Merit 
Systems Protection Board have nullified the Whistleblower Protection Act). 
292 Huffman v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 263 F.3d 1341, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
293 See McCarthy, supra note 291, at 188 (arguing that a vast majority of whistleblowers have 
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whistleblowers who report misconduct related to their job duties and also provided them with enhanced 
remedies.  Richard Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley’s Whistleblower Provisions: Ten Years Later, 64 S.C. L. 
REV. 1, 15 (2012); see Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-199, 126 
Stat. 1465 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C. (2012)) (protecting disclosures made 
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If a disclosure is made during the normal course of duties of an employee, the 
disclosure shall not be excluded from subsection (b)(8) if any employee who has 
authority to take, direct others to take, recommend, or approve any personnel action 
with respect to the employee making the disclosure, took, failed to take, or 
threatened to take or fail to take a personnel action with respect to that employee in 
reprisal for the disclosure. 
5 U.S.C. § 2302(f)(2) (2012).  The Act’s application remains to be seen.  See Moberly, supra, at 52 
(describing possible applications of the Act).  
294 Even if there is overlap, constitutional rights are an independent source of rights whose 
existence and enforcement does not depend on statutes or common law.  See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 439 
(Souter, J., dissenting) (“[T]he applicability of a provision of the Constitution has never depended on 
the vagaries of state or federal law.” (quoting Bd. of Comm’rs, Wabaunsee Cnty. v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 
668, 680 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted))).  
295 See State Whistleblower Laws, supra note 121 (detailing state whistleblower statutes and 
demonstrating that private discussions are not covered by any of said statutes). 
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speech, guaranteeing the rights of all public employees—local, state, and 
federal—who are otherwise subject to the contingencies of the political 
process. 
5.  Regulating Employee Speech Will Result in Excessive Judicial 
Interference 
A lingering concern expressed by courts is that “[g]overnment offices 
could not function if every employment decision became a constitutional 
matter.”296  But will this happen?  I offer three possible replies. 
First, it is a leap to assume that judicial review generates excessive 
judicial interference.  As suggested above, workplace dynamics indicate 
that the number of lawsuits may be suboptimal because of the reluctance to 
exercise voice in the workplace.  If the mechanisms undergirding employee 
silence are psychological, we are unlikely to see a spike in lawsuits.  
Instead, protecting public employee speech is likely to help those who 
manage to overcome the difficulties associated with speaking up. 
Second, the Court has been reviewing employers’ decisions restricting 
employees’ First Amendment rights for decades and yet the concern with 
flooding expressed in cases like Connick, Waters, and Garcetti has failed 
to materialize.  The irony of Garcetti is that by curtailing speech 
protections, it has invited litigation over what counts as “official duties” 
pursuant to which employees are not protected.297  Garcetti’s hope of 
ending litigation thus failed on its own terms.  Moreover, experience in the 
Ninth Circuit suggests that concern about judicial micromanagement is 
overstated.  Prior to Garcetti, the Ninth Circuit applied its own precedent, 
Roth v. Veteran’s Administration.298  Roth extended First Amendment 
protections to speech that was part of official job responsibilities299—a 
protection the Supreme Court would later deny in Garcetti.  Experience 
with Roth, decided in 1988, showed that federal courts in the Ninth Circuit 
were not deluged with cases.300  The Court’s concern with flooding thus 
belies the empirical reality.301 
Finally, concerns with excessive intervention conflate the existence of 
judicial review with the standard it adopts.  For example, courts routinely 
review agency action, but for the most part they adopt a deferential 
                                                                                                                          
296 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418–19 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143 (1983)). 
297 See Totten, supra note 265, at 260 (noting that the Fifth Circuit had to address the question of 
“official duties” due to Garcetti not providing a definition). 
298 Roth v. Veteran’s Admin., 856 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1988), overruled in part by Garcetti, 547 
U.S. at 417. 
299 Id. at 1403. 
300 This point was raised by Justice Souter in the oral arguments.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 
5, Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006) (No. 04-473), available at 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/04-473.pdf. 
301 See Paul M. Secunda, Cultural Cognition at Work, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 107, 135–38 (2010). 
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standard of review.302  Similarly, concerns about judicial intervention 
cannot be understood as a plea to eliminate judicial review from the 
employee speech context.  Instead, attention should be given to the 
particular scope of that review.  It is this question to which I now turn. 
V.  TOWARD PUBLIC/PRIVATE DIVERGENCE:  TWO PROPOSALS 
The decline in constitutional protection for public employee speech is 
attributable to larger transformations in the public sector that are driven by 
a free market ideology, the manifestation of which is that public employees 
are no different than private employees.  This explains why public and 
private employees find themselves on a similar, though not exact, footing 
when it comes to free speech; why privatization and outsourcing are 
largely viewed as desirable; and why civil service reforms that strip public 
employees of traditional protections are on the rise.  These trends combine 
to generate a loss of public employee speech that has been overlooked by 
the scholarly literature. 
Proposing particular prescriptions, however, turns out to be more 
complicated.  The Court did not just “get it wrong.”  It turned to this 
direction because of its tendency to doctrinally reflect the extant economic 
logic.  To change course the Court must detach its First Amendment 
doctrine from the government’s privatized logic.  Put differently, the Court 
must counter the privatizing tendencies through its free speech doctrine.  
This is more of an attitudinal shift than a doctrinal one. 
Whether or not such a shift is likely depends on a variety of factors, the 
analysis of which goes beyond the scope of this Article.  Below, I confine 
myself to two proposals that address the specific problem of public 
employee speech.  The first seeks to undo the Court’s jurisprudence that 
was discussed in Part II.  The second focuses on the public workplace and 
on the possibility of utilizing internal regulatory mechanisms to protect and 
encourage valuable speech.  While the first proposal is possible, it is 
unlikely to be realized in the near future given the Court’s composition.  
The second proposal bypasses this problem by looking at non-judicial 
regulation of speech.  It thus seeks to avoid costly and often inefficacious 
litigation; yet it too comes at a price, namely, the pitfalls of self-regulation 
and the lack of potentially meaningful monitoring through judicial review. 
A.  Judicial Review:  Doctrinal Revisions and the Restoration of Pickering 
The increasing complexity entailed in determining whether public 
employee speech receives constitutional protection is counterproductive, 
                                                                                                                          
302 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842–44 (1984); see David 
Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96 VA. L. REV. 135, 143–44 (2010) (observing that the highly deferential 
Chevron standard is the one most frequently applied in judicial review of agency action). 
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under-protects valuable speech, and creates a chilling effect for workplace 
voice.  The solution, I argue, requires a return to the Pickering framework, 
taking into account all relevant factors for the speech situation instead of 
eliminating some speech as a threshold matter. 
Recall the four problems identified above303: First, prima-facie 
constitutional protection turns on whether the employee spoke as a 
“citizen” or as an “employee.”  A person speaks as an “employee” when he 
speaks “pursuant to official duties.”  Second, much of the Court’s case law 
is driven by the internal/external distinction, according to which in order to 
qualify as a “citizen” for First Amendment purposes, speech outside the 
job is likely to receive more protection, even if it relates to the job.  Third, 
the Court understands disruption and efficiency in terms that ignore 
whether disruption actually occurred and whether efficiency was actually 
compromised.  Fourth, the Court’s doctrinal uniformity ignores the 
institutional diversity of government. 
These problems are interrelated.  Distinguishing between employee 
and citizen is an arbitrary distinction that tries to get at the essence of what 
warrants protection.  It has turned out to be unhelpful, partly because the 
reason public employee speech is deemed valuable is we think employees 
have important things to say about the government workplace, and 
specifically as it relates to their job—the one area in which their expertise 
is the greatest.  Unsurprisingly, some of that speech is derived from their 
official duties and made in the course of exercising them.  By adopting a 
formalistic distinction, the Court fails to recognize that employees can act 
as citizens when they perform their job duties.  Therefore the Court should 
not consider speech “pursuant to official duty” as categorically unprotected 
speech.  Of course, there may be situations where the Court might want to 
give less protection to speech that is part of the work product, but this can 
be part of the Pickering balance and it leaves the door open, in principle, 
for constitutional protection. 
Similarly, that speech should receive more protection if it occurs 
outside the job is a misconceived attempt to subordinate complex 
workplace realities to bright line rules.  The Court assumes that when an 
employee goes outside the chain of command, there is a higher likelihood 
of her speaking “as a citizen.”  This assumption contradicts research 
demonstrating that the decision how to speak, and not simply whether to 
speak, depends on contextual circumstances.304  Sometimes employees 
speak to their supervisors or their supervisors’ supervisors; sometimes they 
will choose to go beyond the chain of command and speak to the media or 
                                                                                                                          
303 See supra Part II.C (presenting four problems raised by the decline in constitutional protection 
of speech). 
304 For detailed case studies, see ROSEMARY O’LEARY, THE ETHICS OF DISSENT: MANAGING 
GUERRILLA GOVERNMENT 26–89 (2006). 
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a different government agency.  The decision how to speak, however, has 
little to do with the value of the speech.  For example, employees are likely 
to speak inside the job when they believe that there is a good chance that 
superiors will take them seriously and work to remedy problems.  But 
when the superiors themselves are complicit in the wrongdoing or when 
they share the views of those the employee speaks against, the employee 
may wish to speak outside the job.305 
The decision to speak internally or externally is contextual and 
depends on the severity of the wrongdoing or disagreement, the fear of 
retaliation, the organizational culture, the employee’s status, the 
importance of the practice to the organization, and a host of other factors 
that do not make their way into the Court’s rigid formula.306 
As a result, there are good reasons to reverse the Court’s approach.  
Instead of encouraging employees to go outside to receive protection, the 
Court should extend protection to internal speech while at the same time 
being open to protecting external speech when internal speech is unlikely 
to be effective.307  Privileging internal speech, together with protection of 
external speech in the appropriate circumstances, means that there is no 
good reason to exclude ex ante a particular speech strategy when that 
strategy bears little or no relation to the value of the speech and depends on 
contextual factors that are not currently embodied in the Court’s doctrinal 
tests.  Similar to the employee/citizen distinction, considerations of why an 
employee chose the forum that she did and why she decided to speak 
internally or externally should inform the Pickering balance rather than 
preempt it. 
Restoring the Pickering balance does not mean that all employee 
speech is protected.  Pickering still limited employee speech when the 
value of the speech was outweighed by the government’s interest in non-
disruption and the efficient delivery of public services.308  But, as the 
foregoing analysis demonstrated, courts have been overly deferential to 
employer perceptions of disruption and efficiency, so much so that courts 
regularly uphold adverse employer actions even when no evidence of 
disruption and harms to efficiency are offered.  In fact, in many of the 
                                                                                                                          
305 Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, Who Blows the Whistle to the Media, 
and Why: Organizational Characteristics of Media Whistleblowers, 32 AM. BUS. L.J. 151, 165 (1994). 
306 See, e.g., id. (arguing that the decision with whom to speak is derived from situational and 
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Obligations, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 433, 462 (2009).  
308 Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). 
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cases referenced throughout this Article, employers often concede that the 
plaintiff-employee’s performance is positive.309 
What is needed, then, is not an abandonment of the disruption and 
efficiency prongs, but a retooling of how those terms are construed.  
Specifically, judges should adjust the burden of proof for showing that 
disruption has occurred or that efficiency has been compromised, or that 
there are strong reasons to believe that such consequences are likely.  
Absent such a showing, the justification for adverse employer action is 
significantly reduced.310  The evidentiary requirement also goes some way 
toward mitigating employer biases resulting from employee speech that is 
perceived as challenging the authority of the system.  As discussed 
above,311 employers often overestimate the threat employee speech poses, 
especially when that speech dissents from office policy.  Deferring to 
employer perceptions buttresses rather than counteracts these biases.  
Moreover, it facilitates a conflict of interest whereby those most threatened 
by the speech are the ones who decide on its outcomes. 
Courts are rightfully worried about overstepping their boundaries and 
intervening in areas traditionally left to other institutions, namely the 
management of the government workforce.  But this does not mean that 
courts have no role to play.  Judicial intervention is more justified in areas 
that are prone to conflicts of interest and biases.  Just as courts developed 
the “hard look doctrine” to determine whether agencies took a “hard look” 
at the underlying questions of fact and policy,312 so too can they adopt this 
standard when examining employer actions that limit public employee 
speech.  Correlatively, employers will be more likely to take public 
employee speech seriously if they know their actions will be subjected to 
closer judicial scrutiny.313 
One main objection to this expanded conception remains.  Protecting 
public employee speech may harm the government’s ability to convey its 
own message or fill positions that require a high level of loyalty.  Imagine 
                                                                                                                          
309 See, e.g., Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 443 n.15 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting) (stating 
that prior to being denied a promotion, the employee received a “stellar review”); Waters v. Churchill, 
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313 See Jim Rossi, Redeeming Judicial Review: The Hard Look Doctrine and Federal Regulatory 
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look review encourages democratic deliberation and ensures consideration of competing interests).  
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a press secretary who, instead of delivering her supervisor’s’ message, uses 
her position to present her own views; a prosecutor who, in closing 
arguments, speaks favorably about the defendant’s actions; or a teacher 
who is hired to teach evolution and insists on teaching intelligent design.  
In these cases and others, if public employees were constitutionally 
protected the government would encounter substantial difficulties in doing 
its job. 
This is a valid objection, but on closer examination it applies only to a 
subset of speech and to a subset of public employees.  Many public 
employees are not hired to deliver the government’s viewpoint, and even 
those who are hired for this purpose, do so only part of the time.314  
Moreover, most government employees do not staff positions that require 
dealing with particularly sensitive information or high levels of loyalty.  
This suggests a deeper problem with the Court’s view of public officials.  
The doctrinal framework does not distinguish one employee from another 
or one government institution from another.  A public school teacher, a 
scientist working for the EPA, a police officer, and a press secretary are all 
treated alike, regardless of their role and institutional affiliation. 
This problem is fixable by incorporating two limiting principles.  All 
public employees should enjoy the First Amendment protections delineated 
in Pickering.  However, the government should be able to control the 
speech of the employees it specifically hires to deliver its viewpoint when 
those employees engage in that role.  Further, the government should be 
able to limit protections for particularly unique positions requiring special 
levels of loyalty and trust.315  Thus there is a difference—one the First 
Amendment should be sensitive to—between employees who speak about 
the government and employees who speak for the government316 as well as 
a difference between ordinary workers and those who are placed in 
positions requiring significantly higher levels of trust and loyalty.  
Government employs many people for different purposes, but only some of 
them are hired for these specific purposes.  An institutionally-driven 
examination of the employee’s role and its relation to the institutional 
mission would reveal whether the employee is subverting the message she 
was hired to disseminate or creating confusion between her position and 
                                                                                                                          
314 See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 437 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“Some public employees are hired to 
‘promote a particular policy’ by broadcasting a particular message set by the government, but not 
everyone working for the government, after all, is hired to speak from a government manifesto.”). 
315 Similarly, the Civil Service Reform Act excludes from coverage any jobs that have 
“confidential, policy-determining, policy-making, or policy-advocating character.”  5 U.S.C. § 
2302(a)(2)(B)(i) (2012). 
316 For a similar position, see Helen Norton, Government Workers and Government Speech, 7 
FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 75, 80–82 (2008), arguing that expressions of the government’s viewpoint must 
be clearly identified as such, so that “voters can more accurately assess the message’s credibility and 
hold the government accountable for that viewpoint if they so desire.” 
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the government’s.  Likewise, it would reveal whether she occupies a 
unique position requiring high levels of loyalty, or whether she is speaking 
about the government in a way which does not lead others to believe she is 
speaking for the government.317 
This formulation improves on current doctrine in two ways.  First, it 
protects a larger universe of speech.  Under Garcetti all speech pursuant to 
“official duties” is categorically unprotected.318  Indeed, Ceballos was 
found to be acting within official duties when contesting the validity of the 
search warrant.319  But Ceballos did not speak against the warrant in the 
course of prosecuting the case.  He spoke about it to his superiors and to 
the police.320  True, a prosecutor is hired to deliver the government’s 
message when he speaks as the government, but this does not extend to 
every facet of his work.  By focusing on the employee’s particular function 
and role at the time of the speech we not only protect more speech, but we 
better protect speech that is at the core of the rationale for protecting public 
employee speech—providing an internal check on government conduct. 
Second, discarding the ambiguity entailed in the “official duties” test 
simplifies the remedial stage.  Obtaining damages in § 1983 suits is 
difficult because public officials enjoy qualified immunity, the conditions 
of which are easy to satisfy.321  Officials are entitled to immunity as long as 
the right violated was not “clearly established.”322  Since the “official 
duties” test has generated confusion, there will be more instances in which 
the speech right was not clearly established.  Thus, even if a court 
determines that an employee was not speaking pursuant to an official duty, 
the government can claim that the employer reasonably believed that the 
right in that particular speech situation was not clearly established, 
increasing the scope of qualified immunity and making recovery more 
difficult. 
To sum up, the doctrinal changes recommended here would simplify 
                                                                                                                          
317 Although the Court has refused to consider institutional roles as a relevant criterion for First 
Amendment protection, a one-size-fits-all First Amendment is unsuitable in a world of institutional 
diversity where officials do many different things.  See PAUL HORWITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT 
INSTITUTIONS 9 (2013)  (“[T]he categories with which we carve up the world of the First 
Amendment . . . . should be based on the richly complex world of free speech rather than the simplified 
legal picture of ‘speaker’ and ‘state.’”); Frederick Schauer, Principles, Institutions, and the First 
Amendment, 112 HARV. L. REV. 84, 86 (1998) (“[I]t is increasingly clear that the refusal to draw 
doctrinal distinctions among culturally distinct institutions is simply unworkable in the context of the 
vast and increasing domain of free speech claims about government land, government funds, and 
government employees.”). 
318 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421. 
319 Id. at 421–22. 
320 Id. at 414. 
321 See David Rudovsky, The Qualified Immunity Doctrine in the Supreme Court: Judicial 
Activism and the Restriction of Constitutional Rights, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 23, 26–27 (1989) (noting that 
qualified immunity applies if the official’s conduct was “objectively reasonable”). 
322 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 
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current analysis by doing four things:  
(1) Abandoning the employee/citizen distinction by 
subordinating the “official duties test” to the Pickering 
balance;   
(2)    Reversing the internal/external distinction, privileging 
internal speech while also protecting external speech 
when internal speech is unlikely to be effective;  
(3)    Engaging in closer judicial scrutiny of employer claims 
about efficiency and disruption; and   
(4)    Denying constitutional protection to employees who are 
hired to deliver a particular government viewpoint when 
they speak specifically in that role and limit protection 
of employees who, in virtue of their position, have 
undertaken significantly higher levels of loyalty. 
B.  Self-Regulation at the Public Workplace 
Revising the doctrinal standards provides additional protection to 
public employee speech in the spirit of public/private divergence.  
Litigation, however, introduces other problems relating to cost, time, and 
additional stress, because litigating parties will often have to continue 
working with one another as litigation proceeds.323  Moreover, it creates 
uncertainty about how the standards will be applied while hurdles such as 
qualified immunity will frequently prevent full remediation.324  Thus, 
litigation itself can create a chilling effect by discouraging employees from 
speaking. 
Against this background, an alternative to judicial review is internal 
workplace regulation.325  This can consist in workplace speech policies, 
                                                                                                                          
323 See Estlund, supra note 231, at 1475–76 (describing the strains of litigation on the workplace); 
Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of Self-Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. 
REV. 319, 332–33 (2005) (recognizing that employees are often wary of suing their employers, given 
“the cost of litigation and the difficulty of proving the requisite unlawful motive” and the fact that they 
will be recast within the business as “victims seeking redress for past wrongs”). 
324 See George Rutherglen, Public Employee Speech in Remedial Perspective, 24 J.L. & POL. 129, 
142 (2008) (noting the differences with the Pickering balancing test and how an employer can often use 
qualified immunity to defeat an employee’s claim that survives the balancing test); Wells, supra note 
48, at 959 (describing the remedial process as “obstacle-laden”). 
325 For representative overviews of government regulation, see IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, 
RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 3 (1992).  See also CYNTHIA 
ESTLUND, REGOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: FROM SELF-REGULATION TO CO-REGULATION 82–83 
(2010) (“[I]nternal accommodations to the rise of employee rights began as what we might call 
‘managing under the shadow of the law,’ but they have evolved toward forms of regulated self-
regulation in which the law explicitly encourages and rewards employers’ self-regulatory efforts.”); 
Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary 
Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 344 (2004) (“The new governance model . . . . promises a 
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dissent channels, and internal enforcement.  Because courts only provide 
the constitutional floor, government offices can go beyond current levels of 
protection and design arrangements that give employees more coverage 
and certainty when they decide whether to speak.326  Because courts are 
reluctant to intervene in employment relationships, government institutions 
might be better suited to devise more protective speech policies. 
Yet if organizations prefer less monitoring, why would they adopt 
internal forms of self-regulation when those result in additional 
monitoring?327  The answer can be found in both external and internal 
factors.  Externally, pressure from the public or from other branches, when 
the issue is sufficiently salient, may drive organizations to adopt more 
expansive speech policies.  An example from the private sector can be 
found in the enhanced whistleblower protections included in the Dodd-
Frank Act following the 2008 financial crisis.328  Internally, organizations 
themselves may have such incentives if they come to believe that speech 
protections might avert disaster, or that particular disasters could have been 
averted had self-regulation been in place.  The promise of decreased 
judicial review may also affect organizations’ willingness to adopt more 
expansive policies.  Finally, increased public service motivation, typically 
found in public organizations,329 may also motivate public-regarding 
actions such as increased speech protections.  These factors create 
incentives for a self-regulatory framework that, in exchange for its 
adoption, would limit judicial intervention.  From the perspective of 
employees, the turn to self-regulation might be more promising in light of 
the near consensus that private enforcement through litigation often fails to 
vindicate common law and statutory employment claims.330  In addition, 
                                                                                                                          
renewed dialogue between those who champion centralized top-down regulation and those who 
advocate devolution, deregulation, and privatization.”). 
326 See Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional 
Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1250–53 (1978) (arguing that limited judicial competence and 
legitimacy does not prevent (and sometimes obligates) other branches to provide more constitutional 
protection).  Recall also that providing a safe environment for speech encourages pro-social voice.  See 
supra text accompanying note 283. 
327 See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 234, at 898 (criticizing self regulation on the grounds that 
an ill motivated executive is unlikely to adopt or respect such reforms).   
328 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 922, 
124 Stat. 1376, 1841 (2010) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (2012)). 
329 See infra note 334. 
330 On the general failure of private enforcement, see Timothy P. Glynn, Taking Self-Regulation 
Seriously: High-Ranking Officer Sanctions for Work-Law Violations, 32 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 
279, 289–95 (2012).  See also Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination 
Plaintiffs in Federal Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 103, 103–04 (2009) 
(showing that the number of employment discrimination suits continued to decline, and arguing that 
“results in the federal courts disfavor employment discrimination plaintiffs, who are now forswearing 
use of those courts”); Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment Discrimination 
Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 429, 429 (2004) (noting that 
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effective self-regulation will also divert employees from speaking 
externally, thus minimizing disruption.331 
To be sure, self-regulation is far from perfect.332  In the private sector 
employment context its success has been mixed, mostly because employer 
noncompliance is often the result of the need to reduce costs to maintain 
profit margins.  When the ultimate goal is profit maximization, coupled 
with minimal legal sanctions and overextended regulatory agencies, self-
regulation is unlikely to work and may result in window dressing or 
cosmetic compliance.333  But as I argued above, such considerations may 
count for less in the public sector where profit considerations should not 
claim a central hold on policymaking and where a public service ethos is 
more dominant.334  Because the experience with self-regulation in the 
                                                                                                                          
employment discrimination plaintiffs go to trial often, win a low percentage of cases, and have a large 
percentage of winning cases appealed); Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations, supra note 113, at 67 
(noting the failure of the vast majority of whistleblower retaliation claims filed under Sarbanes-Oxley).  
But see Richard Moberly, The Supreme Court’s Antiretaliation Principle, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
375, 376 (2010) (“In each of five recent cases involving statutory-based employee retaliation claims, 
the Supreme Court has upheld the employee’s claim and expanded protections against employer 
retaliation.”). 
331 Elletta Sangrey Callahan & John W. Collins, Employee Attitudes Toward Whistleblowing: 
Management and Public Policy Implications, 11 J. BUS. ETHICS 939, 946 (1992) (noting that 
employees prefer internal disclosure to external disclosure).  This joins empirical findings 
demonstrating that employees care about fair processes.  Procedural justice itself often bestows 
legitimacy, even if the substantive claims are rejected.  See Tyler, supra note 180, at 382 (“Recent 
research suggests that . . . the willingness of people to defer to the decisions of authorities and to the 
rules created by institutions is [determined by] the fairness of the procedures through which institutions 
and authorities exercise authority.”). 
332 See, e.g., Paul M. Secunda, The Wagner Model of Labour Law Is Dead—Long Live Labour 
Law!, 38 QUEEN’S L.J. (CAN.) 545, 570 (2013) (arguing that “the power dynamic in the workplace is 
suffused with employer control over the employee’s job” making effective self-regulation unlikely).  It 
is an open question whether those pathologies will be reproduced in the public sector.  
333 See, e.g., Glynn, supra note 330, at 305–07 (“[C]laims that . . . forms of self-regulation can fill 
regulatory gaps now seem dubious, given the colossal failures of self-governance that contributed to the 
financial meltdown of 2008.”); Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of 
Negotiated Governance, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 487, 487 (2003) (“[I]nternal compliance structures do not 
deter prohibited conduct within firms and may largely serve a window-dressing . . . .”); Kimberly D. 
Krawiec, Organizational Misconduct: Beyond the Principal-Agent Model, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 571, 
572 (2005) (“[A]n internal compliance-based liability system encourages the implementation of largely 
cosmetic internal compliance structures that reduce legal liability without reducing the incidence of 
organizational misconduct.”). 
334 The higher levels of public service motivation and public regarding ethos in the public sector 
have been substantiated in decades of research and demonstrate that public employees are less 
susceptible to monetary incentives than private employees.  See, e.g., Gene A. Brewer, Building Social 
Capital: Civic Attitudes and Behavior of Public Servants, 13 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 5, 20 
(2003) (“[P]ublic employees are more civic minded than are other citizens, and they are more likely to 
participate in civic affairs.”); Gene A. Brewer & Sally Coleman Selden, Whistle Blowers in the Federal 
Civil Service: New Evidence of the Public Service Ethic, 8 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 413, 429 
(1998) (finding that public employees are relatively unmotivated by financial rewards, regardless of 
whether they are involved in whistleblowing); Moynihan, supra note 206, at 247–48, 263–64 (arguing 
that the material rewards that work well in ensuring compliance in private institutions, when applied to 
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public employee speech context is limited, what follows is tentative.335 
Compared with judicial review, self-regulation has the advantage of 
tailoring the level of protection to the particular institutional mission and 
the relationship of the employee to that mission.  As discussed above, one 
deficiency of judicial review is that it treats all public employees alike, 
regardless of their role and institutional location.336  While judges may be 
reluctant to make such distinctions given their limited knowledge of 
particular institutions and their preference for bright-line rules, non-judicial 
institutions are not similarly constrained.  Public employers and employees 
are intimately familiar with the working of their institutions and can thus 
make calibrated judgments about the desired level of protection. 
Self-regulation also has the potential advantage of being deliberative 
and participatory.  This can be achieved in two ways.  From the employee 
side, the public union can represent the employees in negotiations over the 
content of such policies.  In workplaces that are not unionized, individual 
employees, selected by the larger employee body, can participate in such 
negotiations.  From the public side, the general public and organizations 
that are interested in good governance will have the opportunity to provide 
input on the precise wording of such arrangements, such as through notice 
and comment procedures.  Consequently, these policies are likely to be 
more speech-protective if they are determined jointly by employees and 
employers along with public input.  Such a process also enhances 
accountability on several levels.   The public will be informed about the 
management of government as it pertains to speech restrictions, which will 
facilitate public criticism and closer scrutiny of government.  The 
transparency of speech policies is also likely to result in more speech-
protective arrangements.337  From the employee side, speech policies will 
provide greater specificity, which will presumably place employees on 
firmer ground when they decide to speak.  On its own, this can have the 
salutary effect of facilitating employee voice, since valuable speech is 
                                                                                                                          
public and nonprofit institutions, can crowd out participants who are more likely to be motivated by 
intrinsic factors, such as public service norms); Hal G. Rainey, Reward Preferences Among Public and 
Private Managers: In Search of the Service Ethic, 16 AM. REV. PUB. ADMIN. 288, 297 (1982) (“[T]here 
are many public sector employees who do not place overriding value on monetary incentives.”); Esther 
E. Solomon, Private and Public Sector Managers: An Empirical Investigation of Job Characteristics 
and Organizational Climate, 71 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 247, 253 (1986) (discussing a study showing 
financial rewards to be a stronger motivator for private managers than for public managers). 
335 The writing on self-regulation, even in the context of employee speech, focuses on the private 
sector and its interaction with the regulator (usually as a monitor of self-regulation).  See, e.g., 
ESTLUND, supra note 325, at 83–84 (describing how private entities have created internal mechanisms 
for handling claims of violations); Orly Lobel, Lawyering Loyalties: Speech Rights and Duties Within 
Twenty-First-Century New Governance, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1245, 1246 (2009) (arguing that internal 
reporting encourages an environment of trust and minimizes disruptive speech). 
336 See supra Part V.A.  
337 For a discussion of the utility of speech policies, see Lee, supra note 57, at 1746–49. 
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more likely to happen in a supportive and safe environment. 
Courts, on their part, will be more deferential to employer actions.  
This is an incentive for both employers and employees who want to avoid 
litigation.  There will still be judicial review, but it will focus on the 
administrative processes leading to the adoption of the policies, such as 
making sure that the policy was clear, that it was open for public comment, 
and that employees participated in its framing.  Courts might be especially 
deferential if the policy goes beyond the constitutional floor.  In 
appropriate cases, courts should also be able to go beyond the inquiry into 
process and examine whether, in fact, a good faith effort was made to 
address the employee’s concern.   
There is nothing radical in such a process.  Self-regulation in the 
private sector often operates along these lines.338  For example, the United 
States Sentencing Commission’s Organizational Sentencing Guidelines 
allow for a reduction in criminal sentences where the organization has 
engaged in an “effective compliance and ethics program” and “promote[s] 
an organizational culture that encourages ethical conduct and a 
commitment to compliance with the law.”339  This has led many firms to 
enact such programs, to various degrees of effectiveness, and it has been 
adopted in other areas, such as environmental law, healthcare law, and 
occupational safety and health law.340  A similar pattern exists in the 
employment discrimination context.  The Ellerth/Faragher defense to 
workplace sexual harassment allows employers to avoid vicarious liability 
for sexual harassment committed by supervisory employees if the 
employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct sexually 
harassing behavior and if the employee failed to take advantage of any 
preventative or corrective opportunities provided by the employer.341  As 
scholars have observed, both employers and employees can invoke the 
existence of internal compliance structures as circumstantial evidence for 
proving discriminatory intent.342 
The experience with such regimes is mixed, for two main reasons.343 
Private firms operate in a competitive environment where they naturally 
                                                                                                                          
338 See Lobel, supra note 325, at 344–45 (describing the move from command and control to new 
governance regimes). 
339 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1 (2010). 
340 ESTLUND, supra note 325, at 78. 
341 E.g., Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 134 (2004); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 
U.S. 775, 807 (1998); Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998); see also Kolstad v. Am. 
Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 545–46 (1999) (allowing an affirmative defense to Title VII suits for 
punitive damages if the employer promulgated anti-discrimination policies and provided anti-
discrimination education). 
342 E.g., Glynn, supra note 330, at 311 n.167. 
343 See, e.g., Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, Management-Based Regulation: Prescribing 
Private Management to Achieve Public Goals, 37 L. & SOC’Y REV. 691, 724–25 (2003) (concluding 
that the empirical record is mixed). 
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seek to reduce compliance costs.  Self-regulation is often costly, making 
these arrangements less robust than they could have been.  In addition, 
information asymmetries between firms and regulators can lead firms to 
adopt internal compliance structures that look good on paper but which fail 
to address the underlying wrong.344 
While this mixed track record casts some doubt on the likely success of 
governmental self-regulation of speech, the differences between the two 
sectors also suggest that these problems are less likely to be replicated.  
The lack of market competition and the general mindfulness of 
constitutional rights in the public workplace, coupled with a deliberative 
and participatory framework at the front end, militate in favor of an 
assumption, however tentative, that such arrangements may be successful. 
In addition to providing certainty over what speech will receive 
protection, workplace speech policies can also be designed to encourage 
employee voice.  One common instrument that has been instituted in both 
the public and private sector is internal grievance procedures.  These 
procedures are sometimes created in order to comply with legal 
requirements or to mitigate future liability.  Initially these procedures did 
not insulate firms from liability, but as their usage increased, courts have 
come to be more deferential.345  Indeed, private firms determining what 
counts as compliance is one risk with self-regulation,346 as is the risk that 
such processes will be co-opted and distorted by interested parties like 
lawyers and personnel managers347 or that grievance procedures will be 
subsumed under a managerial interests conception that will undermine 
individual rights.348 
Internal grievance procedures may succeed if they are construed more 
broadly as general dissent channels that allow employees to challenge, 
                                                                                                                          
344 Kimberly D. Krawiec, The Return of the Rogue, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 127, 146 (2009). 
345 See Lauren B. Edelman et al., The Endogeneity of Legal Regulation: Grievance Procedures as 
Rational Myth, 105 AM. J. SOC. 406, 408 (1999) (“[O]rganizational ideologies of rationality induce the 
judiciary to incorporate grievance procedures into legal constructions of compliance with EEO law.”). 
346 See, e.g., Lauren B. Edelman & Shauhin A. Talesh, To Comply or Not to Comply—That Isn’t 
the Question: How Organizations Construct the Meaning of Compliance, in EXPLAINING COMPLIANCE: 
BUSINESS RESPONSES TO REGULATION 103, 105 (Christine Parker & Vibeke Lehmann Nielsen eds., 
2011) (“[N]otions of rational and fair compliance that evolve within organizations and diffuse 
throughout organizational fields can easily come to influence . . . the rulings of judges.”); Shauhin A. 
Talesh, The Privatization of Public Legal Rights: How Manufacturers Construct the Meaning of 
Consumer Law, 43 L. & SOC’Y. REV. 527, 528–29 (2009) (“Private organizations’ expanding role even 
includes using internal and alternative dispute resolution structures to adjudicate civil and consumer 
rights and remedies created by legislatures.”). 
347 See, e.g., Edelman, supra note 105, at 48–49 (“[T]he legal and personnel professions act as 
‘filters’: they construct not only the meaning of law but also the magnitude of the threat posed by law 
and the litigiousness of the legal environment.”).  
348 See Lauren B. Edelman et al., Internal Dispute Resolution: The Transformation of Civil Rights 
in the Workplace, 27 L. & SOC’Y REV. 497, 529–30 (1993) (arguing that alternative dispute resolution 
methods “may undermine legal rights by changing the way in which disputes are framed”). 
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criticize, and dissent from official government policy while shielding them 
from retaliation.  One example is the State Department’s “Dissent 
Channel,”349 established in 1971 following the fallout from the Vietnam 
War.350  The Dissent Channel allows officials to bring forward dissenting 
views to the attention of the Department’s top officials in complete 
confidentiality and without any fear of reprisals.351  The value of dissent is 
also expressed in the “Dissent Awards” given out by the American Foreign 
Service Association to officials who “exhibited extraordinary 
accomplishment involving initiative, integrity, intellectual courage and 
constructive dissent.”352  The award recognizes members who “challenge 
the system from within, to question the status quo and take a stand, no 
matter the sensitivity of the issue or the consequences of their actions.”353 
Some observers, such as Professor Neal Katyal, extol the virtues of the 
Dissent Channel and call for its adoption in other government agencies.  
Yet, Katyal overlooks the fact that the Dissent Channel has had little 
impact on U.S. foreign policy.354  Not only is it rarely used,355 it is still 
resented by superiors who are in a position to block promotions.356  The 
Dissent Channel is successful, however, in internalizing dissent and 
keeping it in-house.  This may be good for State Department management, 
which goes on the record as formally encouraging dissent, but it has 
transparency costs for the general public, as the channel may result in 
dissent remaining inside the State Department bureaucracy and likely 
buried without being meaningfully addressed. 
Dissent can be valuable because, among other things, it raises the 
political costs of taking action.357  The State Department’s Dissent Channel 
                                                                                                                          
349 See 2 FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL § 071 (2011) (“The Dissent Channel was created to allow its 
users the opportunity to bring dissenting or alternative views on substantive foreign policy issues . . . to 
the attention of the Secretary of State . . . .”); Katyal, supra note 135, at 2328–29 (discussing the 
Dissent Channel). 
350 Hannah Gurman, The Other Plumbers Unit: The Dissent Channel of the U.S. State 
Department, 35 DIP. HIST. 321, 323 (2011). 
351 2 FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL, supra note 349, at §§ 071.1(c), 075.1 (prohibiting any adverse 
action stemming from the use of the Dissent Channel).  As a result of these provisions, most officials 
do not speak anonymously. 
352 Dissent Awards, AM. FOREIGN SERV. ASS’N, www.afsa.org/dissent (last visited Sept. 5, 2013). 
353 Id.  
354 Gurman, supra note 350, at 323. 
355 No current figures are available, but this seems to be the consensus.  In a 1984 Senate hearing, 
it was reported that the channel had been used one hundred and twenty-five times in the past thirteen 
years.  Robert C. Taylor, Improving Management in the Federal Government: 1984 Senate Hearings, 
45 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 262, 264 (1985). 
356 Michael P. Scharf & Colin T. McLaughlin, On Terrorism and Whistleblowing, 38 CASE W. 
RES. J. INT’L L. 567, 570 n.7 (2007).  Although the Manual prohibits reprisals, it will usually be 
possible to provide “legitimate” reasons for adverse employment decisions.  See Gurman, supra note 
350, at 331–33 (discussing one instance in which a Dissent Channel message generated attention). 
357 Of course, there will be times where we would not want the political costs to be prohibitive.  
There are times when quick decisive action is necessary. 
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reduces these costs because dissent is protected only if it is internal.  
Indeed, the channel was developed at a time when the prevention of leaks 
was paramount.358  True, employees can dissent by leaking information to 
the press, but leaks have costs.  The Obama Administration, for example, 
has been particularly aggressive in filing criminal charges against those 
who leaked sensitive information.359  Leakers are protected only if their 
identity remains secret. 
The mere replication of the Dissent Channel in other government 
offices, a move that Katyal endorses, is therefore unlikely to make a big 
difference.  What is needed is a political commitment to dissent and an 
ecology that supports employee voice.  The cultural commitment may even 
be more important than the procedural mechanisms put in place to realize 
these values.360  The lessons from the State Department’s Dissent Channel 
demonstrate that employee voice is likely to be taken more seriously if 
there is a chance the speech will not remain strictly within the department.  
Self-regulation, then, should provide some avenues for going outside the 
bureaucracy, though not necessarily to the public.  For example, in national 
security matters, Professor Richard Moberly has suggested protecting 
employee communication to Congress.361  Such procedures would 
obviously vary depending on the context and the particular institutional 
mission, but the point is that the internal/external distinction—the one that 
should undergo doctrinal reform—applies to self-regulation as well. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Constitutional protection of public employee speech has been declining 
for the past forty years, but the reason for this decline has remained 
elusive.  This Article puts forward a novel explanation that situates public 
employee speech in larger transformations in the public sector and 
identified what I termed as “public/private convergence.”  The main 
feature of the convergence thesis is that public officials are increasingly 
viewed as private employees.  This move has far reaching implications in 
                                                                                                                          
358 Gurman, supra note 350, at 328. 
359 See Charlie Savage, Ex-C.I.A. Officer Charged in Information Leak, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 
2012, at A1 (noting that the number of criminal cases brought against leakers of classified information 
under the Obama administration totaled more “than all previous presidents combined”); Glenn 
Greenwald, Rules of American Justice: A Tale of Three Cases, SALON (Jan. 24, 2012), 
http://www.salon.com/2012/01/24/rules_of_american_justice_a_tale_of_three_cases/singleton/ 
(mentioning the sixth prosecution of a leaker); Jane Mayer, The Secret Sharer: Is Thomas Drake an 
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terms of speech rights that up until now have remained largely unexplored. 
The project of convergence results in under-protection of valuable 
speech.  The path the Court has taken fails to acknowledge the role of 
public officials in our constitutional system by eroding the checking 
function that is uniquely suited to government employees who are often in 
the best position to inform the public and their superiors about government 
work.  To counteract the public/private convergence, this Article has 
advanced a vision of public/private divergence insofar as it pertains to 
constitutional speech rights for public sector employees.  A democratic 
society has an interest in receiving information from its public servants, 
and government itself should be open to dissenting views.  But dissent 
cannot take place in a legal climate that is geared toward suppression and 
silencing.  Convergence brings us closer to that climate.  Divergence, I 
have argued, should be the way forward. 
